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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SANDRA BEYNON,

Case No. 91-0551

Plaintiff\Appellant,
vs.
ST. GEORGE - DIXIE LODGE
# 1743, BENEVOLENT &
PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS,
Defendant\Appellee

Priority No. 16
I
•

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM A DECISION GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO DEFENDANT BY THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY
THE HONORABLE PHILIP EVES, JUDGE PRESIDING
Trial Court Case No. 90-050-3229

Plaintiff\Appellant, SANDRA BEYNON, by and through her
counsel of record John Pace and Brian M. Barnard of the Utah
Legal Clinic on behalf of Utah Civil Rights and Liberties
Foundation, Inc., submits the following BRIEF in support of
Plaintiff's appeal.

STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION
Appellant ("Ms. Beynon") brings this appeal from a
decision by the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for
Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable Philip Eves,
judge presiding.

The Fifth Judicial District Court dis-

missed Beynon7s complaint and granted summary judgment to
the defendant.

Complaint (Exhibit "A" attached); Memorandum

Decision of November 4, 1991 (Exhibit "B" attached); Judgment of Dismissal of December 3, 1991 (Exhibit "C" attached) .
Ms. Beynon seeks reversal of that decision and a ruling
under the Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 to
-4 (1953 as amended) ("Utah Civil Rights Act"), Exhibit "E"
attached, that appellee, St. George - Dixie Lodge # 1743,
Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks ("Elks Lodge")
unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of gender.
Ms. Beynon7s timely appeal was filed December 5, 1991.
Exhibit "D" attached.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OP REVIEW
I.

Issues

DOES THE UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, U.C.A. §§ 13-7-1 ET SEQ.
(1953 AS AMENDED) PROHIBIT THE DEFENDANT ELKS LODGE FROM
DISCRIMINATING AGAINST MS. BEYNON ON THE BASIS OF HER GENDER?

2

1.

As a place of business that sells beer to consum-

ers, is the Elks Lodge subject to the anti-discrimination
mandate of the Utah Civil Rights Act?
2.

As a licensee of the state, entitled to sell liquor

to its members, and guests, is the Elks Lodge subject to the
anti-discrimination mandate of the Utah Civil Rights Act?
3.

Is the Elks Lodge a business establishment for the

purposes of the anti-discrimination mandate of the Utah
Civil Rights Act?
4.

Does the compelling state interest of eradicating

invidious discrimination outweigh any constitutional right
of Elks Lodge members to associate freely?

II.

Standard of Review
Because the trial court7s rulings on all these issues

were strictly legal conclusions, this court need accord them
no deference and should apply a "correction of error" standard of review.

Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152,

1154 (Utah 1989); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247
(Utah 1988).

3

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory provisions are determinative in
this action:
United States Constitution, First Amendment.
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 1.
Utah Civil Rights Act, Utah Code Annotated §§ 13-7-1 to
13-7-4 (1953 as amended).
Utah Code Annotated § 16-6-13.1 (1953 as amended)
(repealed).
Utah Code Annotated § 32-1-3 (1953 as amended) (repealed) .
Utah Code Annotated § 32-1-3 6 (1953 as amended) (repealed) .
Utah Code Annotated § 32A-1-5 (41) (1953 as amended)
The Appendix to this Brief contains copies of these
constitutional and statutory provisions.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This case arises under the Utah Civil Rights Act, Utah

Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended), Exhibit "E"
attached, which prohibits gender discrimination in business
establishments and in enterprises regulated by the state.

4

Included among regulated enterprises subject to the Act are
businesses which sell beer or house a state liquor store.
Ms. Beynon challenges the defendant Elks Lodge's
rejection of her membership application exclusively on the
basis of her gender.

Because the Elks Lodge is licensed by

the state to sell beer and alcohol and exhibits other business attributes, Ms. Beynon contends that this discriminatory conduct is forbidden by the Utah Civil Rights Act.
Waiving her claim for monetary damages, Ms. Beynon seeks
injunctive and declaratory relief against the Elks Lodge.
As a matter of first impression, this Court must determine if the defendant Elks Lodge is a business establishment
for the purposes of this important anti-discrimination
statute.

Additionally, as a matter of first impression,

this Court must determine if the Elks Lodge is an enterprise
regulated by the state under this civil rights provision.
Finally, this Court must determine whether the important
state interest of eradicating invidious discrimination
outweighs the constitutional right of Elks Lodge members to
associate freely.

II.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Ms. Beynon seeks reversal of the decision by the Honor-

able Philip Eves of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and
for Washington County to dismiss her compliant.
5

Judge Eves'

ruling was set forth in his Memorandum Decision of November
4, 1991 (Exhibit "B"), and later embodied in a Judgment of
Dismissal signed December 3, 1991.

Exhibit "C". A notice

of appeal was timely filed on December 5, 1991.

Exhibit

"D".
Judge Eves dismissed this action through a summary
judgment holding that, although the Elks Lodge sells beer to
its customers, has a state liquor license, and has a city
business license, it is not a "place of business" nor a
business establishment for the purposes of the Utah Civil
Rights Act.

Based solely upon the lodge's status as a non-

profit organization, the Judge held that the Elks Lodge was
free to discriminate against Ms. Beynon on the basis of
invidious classification.

To justify his position, Judge

Eves relied upon Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of America, 551 P.2d
465 (Oregon 1976), which maintained, on the basis of unique
legislative intent, that the Boy Scouts was not a place of
public accommodation for the purposes of the Oregon Civil
Rights Act.

III.

Statement of Facts
With the needed sponsorship of a current lodge member,

Sandra Beynon applied for membership to the St. George Elks
Lodge on August 7, 1987. Memorandum Decision at unnumbered
p. 2, Exhibit "B", T.R. p. 1196.
6

Citing Ms. Beynon's gender

as the sole basis for its negative decision, the Elks Lodge
rejected Ms. Beynon's membership application.

Id.

Indeed,

Ms. Beynon met all the Elks Lodge's membership criteria
except the requirement that all members be male.
5 17. Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 1.

Complaint,

Because the Elks Lodge's

actions constituted unlawful gender discrimination, Ms.
Beynon brought this action under the Utah Civil Rights Act.
The St. George Elks Lodge is one of fourteen (14) Utah
chapters of a nation wide fraternal organization that has
existed in the United States for more than one hundred
twenty (120+) years.
1.

Complaint, 5 3, Exhibit "A", T.R. p.

Other than excluding females from its membership, the

Elks Lodge is not particular in its membership selection.
Memorandum Decision at unnumbered p. 2, Exhibit "B", T.R. p.
1196, McClellan Depo. at 24, T.R. p. 1255; Truman Depo. at
12; Foremaster Depo. at 8, 1. 19, T.R. p. 1257. To become a
member of the Elks Lodge, an individual need only:

(a) be a

male American citizen, (b) be over 21 years of age, (c)
believe in God, (d) have never committed a crime, (e) be a
non-communist, (f) be sponsored by at least two members of
the lodge, (g) be willing to uphold the Constitution and
laws of the United States, (h) be willing to pledge allegiance to the United States and to salute the flag, (i) be
of good character, and (j) promote fellowship among members

7

of the Elks Lodge, Memorandum Decision at unnumbered p. 2,
Exhibit "B", T.R. p 1196,
Although these criteria appear to be selective, most,
if not all, men who apply are admitted to membership.

Three

lodge members testified that during their thirty-one (31),
thirty eight (38), and twenty nine (29) years of membership,
they witnessed respectively, no applications, maybe ten (10)
applications and one (1) application rejected for membership.

McClellan Depo. at 24, T.R. p. 1255, Truman Depo. at

12; Foremaster Depo. at 23 and 8, 1. 19. T.R. p. 1257. From
January, 1987 through June, 1989, Elks Lodge members
approved every application for membership presented to
them.1

Exhibit "M", Weekly Meeting Minutes, T.R. p. 748.

During those two and one half years, the investigation
committee, whose duty it was to review the qualifications of
applicants, never issued a negative report on any applicant.
Id.
Other evidence suggests that the relationship between
Elk Lodge members is not intimate.

About ten percent (10%)

of the membership drops out of the organization each year
and each year the Lodge increases its membership by fifteen
percent (15%).

Defendant's Interrogatories 55 41 and 42,

1

Elks Club procedures indicated that each applicant
must be review and accepted by an investigation committee
and then approved by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the general
membership before he is accepted as a member.

8

(June 8, 1989), Exhibit "6". At various Lodge meetings,
Lodge members are repeatedly encouraged to recruit new
membership.

Defendant's Interrogatories (June 1989), 5 45,

Exhibit "7".
Although the St. George Elks Lodge can recruit members
from only Washington County, Utah and small adjoining areas
of Nevada and Arizona, the lodge enjoys a large membership
of more than one thousand (1,000+) men.2 Defendant's Interrogatories at 55 64 (June 8, 1989), Exhibit "1". This
figure represents more than 6% of the male population in
Washington County and more than 8% of the male population in
St. George City.3

There is no limit on the number of men

that can be members of the Elks Lodge, (Kahus Depo. at 56,
11. 1-12, T.R. p. 1259; Defendant's Interrogatories (June 8,
1989), 5 44, Exhibit "2", and each member pays only a modest
initiation fee of seventy-five dollars ($75.00) and an
annual fee of sixty dollars ($60.00) to remain in good
standing with the lodge. Id.

2

In 1988 the membership of the club was 1,012, while
in 1989 the membership was 1,056. Exhibit "1" attached.
3

These calculations are based on a 1988 population
figure of 38,600 for Washington County and of 25,000 for St.
George City. Appellant assumed that one-half of these city
and county residents are male. The percentage is even
greater in light of the fact that a fair member of residents
are under the age of twenty-one.
9

The Elks Lodge is licensed and regulated by the state.
The Lodge has both a St. George City business license,
(Exhibits "I11 and "L") , and formerly a city beer retailer
license, (Exhibit "K"), as well as a state private club
liquor license.4

Exhibit "J".

In return for the privilege

of these government licenses, the Elks Lodge must abide by
extensive state guidelines that govern the distribution of
beer and liquor.

Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Title 32A,

Utah Code Ann. (1986) . As is a requisite for all Utah
establishments to obtain a private club liquor license, the
Elks Lodge must be non-profit corporation.

Ut. Code Ann. §

32A-5-105 and § 32A-5-107 (26) (1953 as amended).

In

addition, all private clubs licensed by the state must be
selective in membership.

Ut Code Ann. § 32A-5-102(3)(b); §

32A-5-107(l)-(4) (1953 as amended).
Far from a profitless or meager operation, the Elks
Lodge sells more than one-quarter of a million dollars
($250,000.00+) of liquor annually and has assets that exceed
one million three hundred thousand dollars ($1,300,000.00+)

4

When this action was first commenced, under Utah law
the sale of beer for on premises consumption was regulated
by local governments. After 1990, licenses to sell beer for
on premise consumption are issued exclusively by the state.
Ut. Code Ann. §§ 32A-10-202 et seq. (1953 as amended).
A state license for on premises beer consumption
requires that the permittee have a current city business
license. Ut. Code Ann. § 32A-10-202(1)(d) (1953 as
amended).
10

in value.

McClellan Depo. at 30, 11. 16-19, T.R. p. 1255;

Annual Report for 1989 to National Elks Lodge, T.R. p. 748.
For the 1986 fiscal year, the lodge earned $25,197.00 from
rental of its facility.
748.

Defendant's Tax Returns, T.R. p.

The lodge also employs twenty-five (25) to thirty (30)

people, (Defendant's Interrogatories at 5 60 (June 8, 1989),
Exhibit " 3 " ) , to serve lunches during the weekdays, dinner
three (3) nights a week and Sunday brunch.

Defendant's

Interrogatories (June 8, 1989) 55 19, 20, Exhibit " 4 " .
Members of the Elks Lodge do not associate in a
cloistered environment.

Instead, the Elks Lodge's

facilities are open to its members, their families and their
guest.

In addition to serving food and beverages to lodge

customers, the Elks Lodge hosts receptions, meetings and
parties and rents the facility to the public for similar
events open to the public.

Defendant's Interrogatories

(August 22, 1988), 55 8 and 36, Exhibit "5"; List of
Facility Uses, T.R. p. 748.5

Non-members and members alike

may pay for the food, drink and services they receive at the
lodge, Id., placing the lodge in direct competition with
other business in St. George that also sell food and
beverages.

Indeed, Ms. Beynon personally has purchased beer

5

For a non-member to rent the facility, she or he
must simply be sponsored by a member who must be present
during the event. T.R. p. 1255, McClellan Depo. at 30, 11.
16-19.
11

and wine at the lodge during the four (4) years prior to her
application.
Importantly, the lodge also provides an opportunity for
members to conduct business and to make important contacts,6
Members take their customers and clients to the club,
discussing business deals over lunch or over drinks.
Foremaster Depo. at 4, 11. 23-24. T.R. p. 1257; Truman Depo.
at 3 and 6.

Members also discuss business with other

members they meet at the lodge.

Foremaster Depo. at 4, 11.

5-7 and at 5, 11. 6-10, T.R. p. 1257.

For example, one

member sponsored a business meeting for his employer, US
WEST at the lodge, (Hansen Depo. at 20, 11. 11-16, T.R. p.
1258), while another sponsored social, business and training
events at the lodge related to his employment with the St.
George Police Department.

Raburn Depo. at 34, T.R. p. 1256.

The central purpose of the Elks organization is to
provide an opportunity for its members to socialize and to
engage in charitable activities.

Defendant's Summary

Judgment Memo at 38 and 48, T.R. p. 1138. Members admit
6

Although provisions enacted by both the national and
local organization prohibit the use of membership in a Lodge
for the promotion of commercial matters, business matters
are discussed and business contacts are made at the lodge
and during other events sponsored by the St. George Elks
Lodge. T.R. p. 1258, Hansen Depo. at 6-7 and at 11, 11. 38. Indeed, lodge members patronize the business of other
members on the basis of contacts made at the lodge. T.R. p.
1258, Hansen Depo. at 8, 11. 14 et seq.; T.R. p. 1257,
Foremaster Depo. at 23, 11. 14-22.
12

that the charitable or other functions of the lodge would
not be diminished by the participation of women as members.
Kahus Depo. at 18, 11. 4-10, T.R. p. 1259; Hansen Depo. at
29, 11. 7 14, at 35, 11. 1-15, T.R. p. 1258; Raburn Depo. at
32, T.R. p. 1256, Foremaster Depo. at 25, 11. 10-14, T.R. p.
1257.

Women are not excluded from any Elks Lodge function

except the Tuesday nigtyt meetings. McClellan Depo. at 21,
11. 6-10, T.R. p. 1255. However, the rituals and ceremonies
preformed at these weekly meetings significantly reinforce
the commitment of members to one and other, to their
community service projects and to the moral principals they
share.

Denying women membership in the Elks Lodge restricts

their participation in lodge and business activities and
undermines their sense of esteem, individuality,
independence and self-worth.

As a class, not as persons,

women are categorically denied the full privileges and
prestige associated with membership in the defendant lodge.

SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT
Every avenue of analysis indicates that the Utah Civil
Rights Act prohibits the Elks Lodge from discriminating
against Ms. Beynon on the basis of her gender.

Adherence to

basic rules of statutory construction, attention to legislative intent, and reference to judicial interpretation of
13

similar civil rights provisions in other states mandates
that the defendant Elks Lodge be prevented from continuing
its unlawful practice of excluding women from its membership.

The Utah Civil Rights Act itself urges broad inter-

pretation and application of its anti-discrimination
provisions in furtherance of its noble purpose.
Because it is licensed to sell beer and alcohol to its
customers, the Elks Lodge is an enterprise regulated by the
state, subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act.

The Utah

Legislature appropriately determined that the Elks Lodge
cannot utilize the privilege of a state license to sell beer
and alcohol and engage in discriminatory practices.

There

is no exemption in this provision for private clubs or nonprofit organizations nor was any exemption contemplated by
the legislative authors of the provision.
The recent passage of the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Act has not altered the application of the Utah Civil Rights
Act to the Elks Lodge.

The prohibition of discrimination in

businesses that "house a state liquor store11 referred to an
arrangement under the former law in which private clubs had
to lease a small space to the state as a state liquor store
to sell liquor to their customers.

The Elks Lodge once

housed such a state liquor store. While this system has
been replaced by a licensing system, the application of the

14
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aiding

si :i i i id f e d e r a l a n d

s t a t e c o n s t fiut ional p r o t e c t i o n s of free a s s o c i a t j < >i i,
precedent indicates that

mpelling state interest of

-.'oiTibat i nn invidious discrimination
lodge membei

e

tu associate freely.

• J tne rights of
Unlike the int

associations among family members a
private organizations, the Elks Lodgt
to be 1 tnjuj J 1.Mil by i;he state.

-

other distinctly
efficiently public

In addition, trie " ft.uh • 1 it

Rights Act is content uuut: tvi 1 and infringes upon defendant's
constitutional rights only incidei
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Elks Lodge is an Enterprise Regulated by the State.
The Utah Civil Rights Act carefully outlaws gender

discrimination "by all enterprises regulated by the state of
every kind whatsoever," Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-3 (1953 as
amended), and then defines "enterprises regulated by the
state" as "all places of business which sell beer to
consumers or house a state liquor store, as permitted by the
Alcohol Beverage Control Act, Title 32A."
13-7-2(3)(b) (1953 as amended).

Utah Code Ann. §

While finding that the Elks

Lodge sells beer to consumers but not deciding whether the
lodge housed a liquor store, the court below held that the
Lodge was not a "place of business" under the definition of
enterprises regulated by the state.

This interpretation of

the Act is inappropriately narrow and incorrect.

A. The Elks Lodge is Subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act
as a Place of Business that Sells Beer to Consumers.
There is no indication that the authors of the Utah
Civil Rights Act intended to define the phrase "all places
of business which sell beer to consumers" narrowly.

Quite

the contrary, Utah Legislators specifically insisted that
the Act "shall be liberally construed with a view to promote
the policy and purposes of the act and to promote justice."
Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-1 (1953 as amended).
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Also inviting

broad interpretation is ftu
ass

,-

rpose of the Act, "to

1 citizens full and equal availabi

goods, services

^cilities", Utah Code Ann. .

(1953 as amended), which J.I
pi oi:It making.

nstrained r\ _-,;yy- notion of

Instead, the Act applies

goods, services

/ision of

facilities, all of which are offered by

non-profit and profit organ

wit i i

alike.

1. A narrow interpretation of "places of business" is
inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the Utah Civil
Rights Act.
Despite language calling for a 1.

.ication of

the Act, the c'l-w* u.K-w maintained that the Elks
not a place of business

poses of tin- Utah Civil

FigMt. A1 \ , insisting that because the hilkis i,
profit organi

,uoes

: -is

not

;•- is n a non-

operate to create monetary

profits, and is not open to in«. general public " its
i it , ; ties are immune from the anti-disci
legislation.
p. 5.

T.R, p. 1196, Memorandum Decision, unnumbeiid

For several reason

malysis is inappropriate.

Placing significance upon the Elks
non-profi4

n

* re's status as a

• « lization that is not open :.* + :ie puL

inconsistent with the

oi the Act.

All private

m o r clubs in Utah must be non-profit corporations and
cannot •

co cue public.

Utah Code Ann, § 3-dA••••-< M M (2)

and § 32A-5-102(1)(e) (1953 as amended).

Unless all private

liquor clubs, including the Zephyr Club or Green Street
Social Club, were to be free to engage in invidious
discrimination, the condition of not being open to the
public and of being a non-profit organization can not be
sufficient to exempt a club from civil rights legislation.
Certainly, the Legislature did not intend to allow the
Zephyr to exclude African Americans from its membership or
allow Green Street to deny memberships to men.

Given that

the Utah Civil Rights Act is intended to reach non-profit,
selective membership organizations, logic dictates that the
Elks Lodge is not exempt merely because it is non-profit and
is not open to the public.

See,

0'Connor v. Village Green

Owners Assn.f 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983) (ruling that nonprofit organizations, such as hospitals, were "business
establishments" and so subject to the Unruh Civil Rights
Act.).7
In addition, the reliance of the trial court herein
upon Schwenk v. BSA, supra,

551 P.2d 465, to contend that

"the [Utah] legislature intended to prohibit gender
discrimination in all places where commercial activities for
the purposes of making monetary profit and offered to the
general public are being conducted" is misplaced.

7

T.R. p.

In Utah many hospitals are non-profit corporations.
Should they be excluded from coverage of the Utah Civil
Rights Act?
18

1196, Memorandum Decision,

*

While the
,i* 0\

Schwenk Court interpreted the language
Accommodat

preventing discrimination by
-

"businesses or commercial
-•••vices," Schwenk at 468, the text
remarkably
Act.8

L|JH Public

/ei i

offer goods or

L

,,

nt is

.: the Utah Civil Rights

More applicable .. ::i— ..•••-

.:

- the term

"business" are better found in Californi
Civil Rig:
Utah Act.

Unruh

language quite similar to that ol; Mi
Prompted by bruad

.1.1" I absolute language, the

lifornia Courts have defined the term

"IUJSI

nous.,

establishment" in the broadest sense reasonably possible,
Pines v. Tomson, 20^
196^;,
or orqu..
Id. (citing,

(Cal.App.

include "all specified priva\

• "• *
groups

' icns" Including "even non-profit organizations, '
O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn., 662

P.2d 427, 33 Cal.3d 790 at 795-796 (1983),
California ease'- are discussed more thoroughly
Finally, under closer

important
infra.

the ruling in Schwenk

actually supports Ms. Beynon's claim that tin Elks Lodge is

8

The Oregon Public Accommodations Act defines a place
of public accommodation as "any place or service offering to
the public accommodations, advantages, facilities or
privileges whether in the nature of goods, services,
lodgings, amusements or otherwise." ORS 30.675(1) (1973
amendment).
19

subject to Utah's anti-discrimination statute.

To determine

that the Boy Scouts in Oregon were not a place of public
accommodation under the Oregon Public Accommodations Act,
the Schwenk Court depended heavily upon the unique
legislative history of the Oregon Act —

to the point of

defining the issue before it as "whether the Oregon
legislature intended this statute" to reach the Boy Scouts.
Id. at 469.

The Court placed significant weight on the

testimony of a single legislative witness who suggested that
the amended Act would not encompass private membership
organizations such as the YWCA and the YMCA.

Id. at 468.

But see, Schwenk v. BSA, 551 P.2d at 470 (O'Connell, J.
dissenting)

(forcefully objecting that legislative history

did not substantiate the commercial and non-commercial
distinction relied upon by the majority).

If this Court

were to use a similar analysis of legislative history to
determine the scope of the Utah Civil Rights Act, it would
be compelled to adopt a broad notion of enterprises
regulated by the state.

Discussion and debate on the floor

of the 1973 Utah Senate indicate that the amendment to the
Act was to prevent gender discrimination by "just about
everybody" including non-profit, "non-commercial" and "non-
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public" 9 enterprises such as > b« ,"ll.< f* In!

Hearing on H.B.

1973 Utah Laws 3 3 isuggest
specifical

enterprises regulated ;:: th*-j state"

included the Alta Club
|:.illt L a k e

C

ity-

roixu liquor club in

Exhibit "G" attached.)

Non-profit/ selective membership organizations that are
semi-private and licensed to sell beer are "places of
business" regulated by the state.
A subsequ

decision in an Oregon Court, indicates

that Schwenk does not suppiiI

Uu? contention that non-profit

organizations are not businesses.

Interest

Lloyd

Lions Club v. Int. Association of Lions Clubs, 724 P.2d

(Or.App. 1986), petition

for

dismissed,

(Oregon 1987), the Oregon Court
Club t

Appeal

usiness for rhe purposes

Lions

f vu- jte^,. - bin.:111

community service organization. Accordix
-

740 P.2d 182

v/^~ •- non-profit

Accommodations Act even

organizatx

887

\r r Club t-^ula

Oregon chapter for vio.: <

»\^t expt

itional
^1

s C±UD rules restricting

membership to men. Id.

9

These terms are in quotes because, although the
Fifth Judicial Court believes that private clubs are not
commercial and are not open to the public, proper analysis
of their activities indicates that they are indeed
commercial and open to the public for the purposes of the
Act,
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Expressly rejecting the argument that a non-profit
organization, ipso

facto,

cannot be a business or commercial

enterprise, the Court insisted that "[t]here is no automatic
equivalency between an organization's overriding noncommercial character and the nature of specific activities
it undertakes which are independent of its non-commercial
activities."

Id. at 891. Despite the non-commercial nature

of the Lions Club's benevolent services, other aspects of
its operations, including its "active promotion and sale of
memberships and the inducement and consequences of business
advantages for members" were business and commercial
activities.

Jd.

The Court also rejected the contention

that the Lions Club was exempted under the "distinctly
private" exception of ORS 30.675(2) because its membership
criteria was "highly selective":

"It is true that the

membership application process has the appearance of being
elaborate, formal and structured.

But the application

process is not selective and almost all men who apply are
admitted to membership."

Id. at 889 (quoting the trial

court with approval).
Under the analysis adopted in Lloyds Lions Club, the
defendant Elks Lodge is a business or commercial enterprise
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that is essentially public.10
ctdii

l

Evei

Court were

x narrow meaning of "places of business", •

that tne terr

^

commercial entities, ,:^ .

Lodge would be constitute such
arion, :he Elks Lodge '
Lodge annual-

Though a non-profit
clearly commercial.
one quarter of a million

dollars in liquor and provides

aai iw

services, competing directly with other Hinir
establishments in the St. George area.
liquor to members and non-member

: beverage
nking

By selling beer and
renting its building

yone sponsored by a member *••* u^ allow

to

stage business CM, I i.v i t Les for their employers at its
facilities, the Elks Lodge cl ear ly offers irr. "accommodat i ons, advantages, facilities, privileges,

10

Analysis of the common meaning of the word
"business" and its usage in Utah law indicates that a
reliance upon a profit/non-profit distinction to define the
term is misplaced. Webster's Dictionary defines "business"
as "activity concerned with the supplying and distribution
of commodities." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1977
Edition. In Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-3(10) (1953 as amended),
a business entity is defined as "a sole proprietorship,
partnership, association, joint venture, corporation, firm,
trust, foundation, or other organization or entity used in
carrying on a business." See, substantially identical
definitions in Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-5(2), § 59-14B-l(8), §
10-3-1303(3), and § 17-16a-3(3) (1953 as amended). Before
revision, the Utah Rules of Evidence defined business to
include "every kind of business, profession, occupation,
calling or operation of institutions, whether carried on for
profit or not." Utah Rules of Evid. Rule 62(6) (since
repealed and replaced). No reference to any profit motive
is expressed in these notions of business.
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services," to the public.

These activities are distinctly

open and commercial.
That the revenue which comes from liquor sales and the
provision of these services is funnelled back into the
organization or are used for charitable purposes or that the
goods may be available only to members and their guests is
irrelevant to the invidious discrimination visited upon
women.

In the case of the Elks Lodge, the unjust

discrimination is compounded because it occurs with the
tacit assistance of the state which has chosen to license
the Elks Lodge as a business entitled to sell beer and
liquor.

Thus, contrary to the finding by the court below,

Oregon case law bolsters Ms. Beynon's contention that nonprofit, selective membership organizations which are semiprivate are "places of business."

3. Faithful to the intent and purpose of the Utah Civil
Rights Act, "places of business1' must be interpreted as
broadly as is reasonably possible.
All evidence suggests that the legislature intended the
term "places of business" to be interpreted broadly.

The

Utah Civil Rights Act itself calls for, and legislative
testimony mandates a liberal application of its antidiscrimination directive.

Finally, if possible, "places of

business which sell beer" must be interpreted in a manner
that avoids rendering the phrase superfluous.
24

Millett v.

Clark Clinic Corporationf
Harmon v. Liquor Control Commission, 445

.yooj;

Gross v. City of Lvnnwood. 583 P. 2d 1197 (Wash, i^b)
("whenever possible statutes shot-M be construed so that: no
cion is superfluous1

Under this princip

"vf utory

construction, t IIM phrase must be given meaning and a broad
interpretation indeed.
Before the Utah Civil Rights Act was i.
outlaw u :,

.y/o uo

iscrimination and to reach enterprises

regulated by the state, tix> ivcatn
discrimination

already prohibited

business establishments",

Ann* §§ 1 3 • ; I

as amended),

when the legislature exparu

MI

Accordingly,

•• scopr of the Act to

include "places of business which sell bee;
add something

the Act,

establishment

epetition

iready included within coverage of the Act
organizations, see,

the phrase "places of business

reach

* • -

"business

Because reference to ••

a broad spectrum of institutioi
infra,

to

"Places of business that sell

beer" must be more than a mei
establishments".11

Code

an uic

Common sense suggests *

must

r rn "business establishments."
t.h" phrase was

11

This argument applies equally to the 19
daed
statutory phrase "all places of business which ,
. house a
state liquor store." Ut. Code Ann. § 13-7-2(3)(b) (1953 as
amended.)
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intended to include every entity legally entitled to sell
beer.

This understanding is particularly appropriate

because every entity legally entitled to sell beer must have
a government license.
Alternatively, if the legislature meant not to expand
the meaning of the term business establishments, but instead
to clarify or emphasize that a particular type of business
establishment —

those that sell beer —

are necessarily and

specifically to be included in the Act, the result is the
same.

The Elks Club, simply because it sells beer, is

subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act.

B. The Elks Lodge is Subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act
as a Place of Business that has a State Liquor License.
Prior to July 1, 1985, any private club selling liquor
in Utah clearly "housed a state liquor store" for the
purposes of the Utah Civil Rights Act.

Thus, in 1973, when

the Utah Legislature carefully amended the Civil Rights Act
to cover enterprises regulated by the state, it intended
private liquor clubs to be bound by the anti-discrimination
statute.

When the former Liquor Control Act was repealed

effective July 1, 1985 and replaced by the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act, Title 32A, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended), this legislative intent did not change.

Under the

old state liquor store system, private clubs had to lease a
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small portion of their premises »

The new contrc . a* i n*.* placed

state would sell alcohol.
curious

*tate from which the
this

configuration with a more direct

licensing scheme.

Although ( i iwil:*.' -lubs no longer house

state liquor stores -- but are instead simply Iioencie<i by
th^ s

canons of statutory construction indicate

that tne Act still regular

ies of private liquor

clubs such as the Elks Lodge.
Accord i IN-i to the basic tenets of statutory conA I S to be interpreted to

struction, a problemat

correspond to the overall intent and purposes ni ? iw law.
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980);
Ward v. Richfield City, 798 i M '?'./„ ill Utah Adv.Rep
(Sup.Ct. 1990);
Lake City

Bd. of Education of Granite Sch.

<».vi I'^H ID in

__..

1033 (Utah 1983) ("Intent is

applied to carry

* ;r

-an be done in n

manner which is consistent with the language
s t a i ii'i ii

i

I 3 preserve the goal of Utah legislators to

expand the scope of the Utah

il Rights Act to include

enterprises entitled to sell liquor

i Uien premises, the

CIVI1 Rights Act must be read as still covering private
clubs now licensed i«, i e state to sell liquor.
With the 1985 revision of UUJ iKfiot: and private club
was no mention or indication that the Utah
legislature intended i

i ^ inj,1 private clubs from the Utah
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Civil Rights Act.

Clearly, the purpose of the 1973

amendment to the Civil Rights Act was to eradicate gender
discrimination in enterprises that received privilege and
approval from the state.

To subvert this purpose by

exempting private clubs from the reach of the civil rights
legislation would be unfaithful to the intent and purpose of
the Act.

Importantly, the same degree of state regulation

and imprimatur once associated with housing a state liquor
is still involved in the state / s licensing of a private club
to sell liquor.

Jan. 9, 1985, Memorandum No. 1 from Utah

Liquor Commission to Utah State Legislature at 12 ("[T]he
state has really not lost any real degree of actual control
over the outlet.") Exhibit "M" attached.

Because under the

new licensing scheme the Elks Lodge enjoys the prestige and
advantage of a state privilege, the Elks Lodge must act in a
manner consistent with the Utah Civil Rights Act.
Looking to statutes contemporaneous to the amendment of
the Utah Civil Rights Act is a proper and revealing method
for determining legislative intent.

Lambert v. Mullan, 83

So.2d 601, 603 (Fla. 1955) ("a repealed statute on the same
subject may be looked to the same as other statutes to
ascertain the intention of the Legislature"); Strauahn v.
Amoco Production Co., 306 So.2d 39 (Fla.Ct.App 1975).
Certainly, a proper way to determine what the Legislature
meant by an enterprise that "houses a state liquor store" is
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to look the provision which defined this term at the time
the statute was enacted.

While in 1973, a private club that

sold liquor housed a state liquor store, today, a private
club that sells liquor is licensed by the state.
Finally, when trying to ascertain meaning of a statute,
courts avoid construction rendering some words of the
statute superfluous. Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation,
609 P.2d 934; Harmon v. Liquor Control Commission, 445 P.2d
4; Gross v. City of Lynnwood, 583 P.2d 1197. With the
repeal of the old liquor laws, Title 32, the only entity
that now literally "houses a state liquor store" is the
state of Utah.12

If the proper meaning "houses a state

liquor store" were ignored, exempting private clubs with
state liquor club licenses and public liquor licensees from
the Act, the entire provision would be made superfluous or
so limited to be almost meaningless.
12

Since enactment of the

Today, "state stores," as they are now referred to
in the state liquor laws, Ut.Code Ann. § 32A-2-101 (1953 as
amended), are state controlled and operated retail outlets
for liquor located in store fronts. Prior to 1985
restaurants that sold liquor to patrons also "housed state
liquor stores" in the same manner as private clubs as
described herein. Under current liquor laws such
restaurants no longer literally "house state liquor stores,"
but are licensed as public liquor businesses. Ut.Code Ann.
§§ 32A-4-102 et seq. (1953 as amended).
Thus, under defendant's proposed re-defining of the
phrase "house a state liquor store," a restaurant today
selling liquor to patrons is not an enterprise regulated by
the state for application of the Utah Civil Rights Act.
The term "state liquor store" is not found in the
current Alcohol Beverage Control Act.
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Fourteenth Amendment, or at least since Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down a statute that preferred men
over women as administrators of estates), a state has been
prohibited from engaging in gender discrimination.

Thus, to

preserve the meaning and purpose of § 13-7-2(3)(b), this
Court must find that private clubs licensed to sell liquor
are still enterprises regulated by the state for the purpose
of the Utah Civil Rights Act.

II. The Elks Lodge is a Business Establishment for the
Purposes of the Utah Civil Rights Act.
In addition to prohibiting discrimination by
enterprises regulated by the state, the Utah Civil Rights
Act forbids discrimination in "all business establishments".
Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1, -3 and -4 (1953 as amended).

With

no laundry list of examples to limit the meaning of the term
"business establishments" and with absolute descriptions
such as "all" and "without", the text of the Act conveys
strong purposes.

By itself, the wide-reaching term

"business establishment" prohibits the Elks Lodge's
discriminatory conduct.

Id.

In an obvious move to reach a wide-range of discriminatory conduct, the Utah legislature went beyond most state
civil rights laws to prohibit discrimination in all business
establishments as well as in places of public accommodation.
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The majority of state civil rights statutes enacted in most
states in the 1960's were patterned after federal civil
rights legislation which prohibited discrimination only in
"places of public accommodation."

Rather than using that

mold, Utah prohibited discrimination in all business
establishments as well in places of public accommodation.
Only Alaska and California civil rights provisions likewise
forbid discrimination in all business establishments.
Alaska Stat. § 18.80.300(7) (1981); Cal Civ. Code § 51 (West
1982).

Importantly, a survey of California case law

provides persuasive insight into the meaning of "business
establishment" for the purposes of civil rights legislation.
To carry out the intent of the legislature and the
expansive scope of the California Civil Rights Act, the
Unruh Act, the California Courts have adopted the broadest
definition of "business establishment" reasonably possible.
Like the Utah Act, the Unruh Act mandates full and equal
access to "all business establishments" and is not limited
by any list of examples which might constrain application of
the Act.

Accordingly, the California Supreme Court

determined that "business establishment" includes "all
specified private and public groups or organizations"
including those that are non-profit.

O'Connor v. Village

Green Owners Assn., 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983).

Thus, the

Unruh Act has been applied to a non-profit home owners
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association, O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn.,

supra,

the Boy Scouts of America, Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of
Boy Scouts, 195 Cal.Rptr. 325 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1983), and a
Christian periodical, Pines v. Tomson, 206 Cal.Rptr. 866
(Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1984).
In 0'Connor, the California Supreme Court determined
that a non-profit home owners association, responsible for
enforcing age restrictions at a condominium complex, was a
business establishment within the meaning of the Unruh Act.
0'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn., 662 P.2d 427. The
Court concluded that the owners association had sufficient
"businesslike attributes" to fall within the scope of the
term "business establishment."

Xd.

Citing 0/Connor, the

California Court of Appeals held that "businesslike
attributes" could be both commercial and non-commercial in
nature.

Curran v. Boy Scouts, 195 Cal.Rptr. at 336.

These California rulings invite this Court to adopt a
similarly broad interpretation of "business establishment"
for the purposes of the Utah Civil Rights Act.

Such an

interpretation would be faithful to the strong language and
remedial purposes of the Utah Act.

As did their counter-

parts in California, Utah lawmakers have progressively
enlarged the reach of the Utah Civil Rights Act.

They

declined to limit the meaning of "business establishment"
either by defining the term or by providing a list of
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examples.

Only a broad interpretation of the phrase would

be consistent with language and purposes of the Utah Act.
Accordingly, under an appropriate expansive definition
of "business establishment", the Elks Lodge is subject to
Utah's mandate against gender discrimination.

As argued

above, the Lodge exhibits many businesslike attributes and
is more readily identifiable as a business than are the Boy
Scouts or a condominium owners association.

By offering

accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, goods
and services the Elks Lodge is necessarily engaging in the
exact business like behavior that the Utah Act was intended
to reach.

See, supra.

Most importantly, by obtaining a

city business license and licenses to sell beer and alcohol,
the Elks Lodge has defined itself as a business
establishment.13

III. The Compelling State Interest in Eliminating Invidious
Discrimination Outweighs the Right of Elks Lodge Members to
Associate Freely.
In Roberts v. United State Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984), the United States Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota
13

Defendant in 1969 filed Articles of Incorporation
with the State of Utah. Those articles make three different
references to the defendant as "transacting business,"
having a "place of business," and "doing business". Exhibit
"F" attached.
Defendant has all of the business like powers of a nonprofit corporation. Ut. Code Ann. § 16-6-22 (1953 as
amended). Exhibit "H" attached.
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statute that required the Jaycees to admit women against a
First Amendment challenge•

The Court held that the

Constitution protected the freedom of association in two
distinct senses.

First, in order to "secure individual

liberty," the Bill of Rights must protect "certain kinds of
highly personal relationships" from unjustified governmental
interference.

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. The most obvious

among these relationships are those that involve the family,
such as marriage, procreation, the education of children and
cohabitation with relatives.

Bd. of Dirs of Rotary

International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545
(1987).

Second, the Court upheld the right of individual to

associate for expressive purposes.
622.

Roberts, 468 U.S. at

However, "[t]he right to associate for expressive

purposes is not

. . . absolute.

Infringements on that

right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of
ideas."

Id. at 623. Applying the Roberts holding to the

present case indicates the relationship among Elks Lodge
members is not the intimate association that warrants
constitutional protection and admitting women members to the
Lodge will not adversely effect the members' expressive
purposes.
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A. The Elks Lodge is Not Sufficiently Personal or Private
to Warrant Constitutional Protection.
Although freedom of intimate association may extend
beyond family relationships, it includes relationships
analogous to family associations that they are
"distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a
high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and
maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in
critical aspects of the relationship."
620.

Roberts, 468 U.S. at

Adopting the Roberts analysis, the Supreme Court

refused to extend constitutional protection to the
relationship among Rotary Club members.

Rotary Club, supra

481 U.S. 537. Over Rotary International7s claim of freedom
of intimate association, the Supreme Court upheld the
California Civil Rights Act although it required California
Rotary Clubs to open membership to women.

Id.

To determine that the relationship among Rotary Club
members was not sufficiently private to warrant constitutional protection, the Court found several factors relevant.
Significant was that "[t]he size of local Rotary Clubs
ranges from fewer than 20 to more than 900," that "[t]here
is no upper limit on the membership of any local Rotary
Club," that "10 percent of the membership of a typical club
moves away or drops out during a typical year," that "[t]he
clubs are . . . instructed to keep a flow of prospects

35

coming to make up for attrition and gradually to enlarge the
membership," that

fl

[m]any of the Rotary Club's central

activities are carried on in the presence of strangers, and
that "rather than carrying on their activities in an
atmosphere of privacy, [Rotary Clubs] seek to keep their"
activities open to the world.

Rotary Club at 546-547.

Although "membership in Rotary Clubs is not open to the
general public," the Court noted that each club is
encouraged to include in its ranks all fully qualified
Id.; See also,

prospective members.

Curran v. Mount Diablo

Council of Boy Scouts, 195 Cal.Rptr. 325 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.
1983) (Boy Scouts not sufficiently private to be exempt from
civil rights legislation); Llovd Lions Club, supra,

724 P.2d

887 (Lions Club not entitled to freedom of intimate association) ; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620-21 (Jaycees not an
intimate association).
Consideration of "factors such as size, purpose,
selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical
aspects of the relationship," Rotary Club at 54 6,
demonstrates that the Elks Club is not sufficiently private
for the constitutional protection to overcome the Utah Civil
Rights Act.

With over 1,000 members, the Elks Club is

larger than any local chapter of Rotary International.

As

with Rotary Clubs, there is no membership limit at the St.
George Elks Lodge.

In addition, the Lodge loses
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approximately 10 percent of its membership annually and
increases its membership by 15 percent•

The central

purposes of the Elks Lodge —

charitable works and social

interchange among members —

are not conducted in private.

Indeed, other than the Tuesday night meetings all Elks Lodge
activities are essentially public and there is no indication
that members seek privacy.

Nor is the Elks Lodge selective

in its membership.14 While the criteria for membership may
appear selective, few, if any prospective applicants have
been denied membership.

Particularly representative of

current Elks Lodge membership policy is that in a recent two
and one half year period, no applications for membership
were rejected.

Most importantly, the Elks Lodge has

relinquished any claim to being an intimate association by
applying for and accepting state licenses to sell beer and
liquor and by opening itself up as a business establishment,
providing its facilities, food and drink to the public.15

14

Given that the membership at the Elks Lodge
represents more than 6% of the male population of Washington
County and more than 8% of the male population of St.
George, any claim that their membership is selective is
necessarily suspect.
15

Defendant's argument and analogy that the Elks Lodge
is an extension of members7 homes fails because no member
may legally sell beer or liquor in his home.
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B. The Application of the Utah Civil Rights Act to the Elks
Lodge Would Not Unconstitutionally Infringe Upon the Right
of Its Members to Associate for Expressive Purposes.
Any claim that the Elks Lodge is entitled to free
association for the purposes of expression is easily
dismissed.

The United States Supreme Court summarily

dismissed the claims of the Rotary Clubs to expressive
association, commenting that "evidence fails to demonstrate
that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any
significant way the existing members/ ability to carry out
their various purposes."

Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548.

Citing socializing and charity as the central purposes of
their organization, Elks Lodge members concede that none of
these activities would be diminished by the participation of
women.

Indeed, women are not excluded from any of the

Lodge's activities other than their Tuesday night meetings.
As with the Rotary Clubs, there is no indication that Elks
Lodge members will be impeded in their freedom of expression
if forced to comply with the Utah Civil Rights Act.
The United States Supreme Court concluded its discussion of Rotary Club's associational rights, determining
that "[e]ven if the Unruh Act does work some slight
infringement on Rotary members' right of expressive
association, that infringement is justified because it
serves the State's compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination against women."
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Rotary Club. 481 U.S. at 549

(citations omitted).

Because the Unruh Act, like the

Minnesota statute challenged in Roberts, was content
neutral, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the California
civil rights legislation presented no undue threat to Rotary
Club members' expressive association.

Similarly, the Utah

Civil Rights Act makes no distinctions on the basis of an
organization's viewpoint and serves the same compelling
interest of assuring equal rights to women. Therefore,
application of the Utah Civil Rights Act to the Elks Lodge's
unlawful discrimination is not constitutionally offensive.

CONCLUSION
For three distinct reasons, the Elks Lodge must conform
to the anti-discrimination mandate of the Utah Civil Rights
Act; the Elks Lodge is a "place of business which sell
beer," "a place of business that houses a state liquor
store" and a "business establishment."

In addition, the

Elks Lodge cannot avoid the reach of the Utah Civil Rights
Act under claims of constitutionally protected free
association.
Analysis of legislative history and contemporaneous
statutes and attention to the specific language of the Utah
Civil Rights Act indicates that the Elks Lodge is an
enterprise regulated by the state.

By requesting and

accepting state licenses to sell beer and liquor, the Elks
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Lodge has subjected itself to state regulation and is within
the ambit of the Utah Civil Rights Act.

The authors of the

Utah Civil Rights Act determined that in return for the
privilege of beer sales and state liquor licenses, the Elks
Lodge must forsake discriminatory conduct.

A failure to

subject non-profit, selective membership, semi-private
organizations to Utah's civil rights legislation would
seriously frustrate the purposes and intent of the Utah
anti-discrimination Act.
Regardless of its sale of beer and liquor, the Elks
Lodge is a "business establishment" for the purposes of the
Utah Civil Rights Act.

As suggested by California civil

rights law, proper interpretation of the term focuses upon
the business-like attributes of an organization.

In direct

violation of the Utah Civil Rights Act, the Elks Lodge
acting like a business, is openly denying Ms. Beynon equal
access to its "accommodations, advantages, facilities,
privileges, goods and services."

This is the exact conduct

that the Utah Legislators intended to prevent.
Finally, the application of the Utah Civil Rights Act
to the Elks Lodge survives any free association challenges.
As a large, non-secretive and non-selective organization,
the relationship among Elks Lodge members is not sufficiently private to warrant constitutional protection.
Further, there is no evidence that admitting women as
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members will adversely affect the ability of current members
to carry out their purposes.

Because the Utah Civil Rights

Act is content neutral, any incidental infringement on Lodge
members' expressive association is outweighed by the
compelling state interest in combating invidious
discrimination.

RELIEF
This Court should reverse the ruling and decision of
the trial court, determine that the Utah Civil Rights Act
applies to the defendant Elks Lodge and remand this case
with instructions to the trial court to enter judgment in
favor of the plaintiff/appellant granting declaratory and
injunctive relief against the illegal gender based discrimination in membership of the defendant St. George Dixie Lodge # 1743, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks.
DATED this 29th day of JULY, 1992.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant
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APPENDIX

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT I

AMENDMENT I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

UTAH CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE I, Section 1

Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend
their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to
worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for
the abuse of that right.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

CHAPTER 7
CIVIL RIGHTS
13-7-1. Policy and purposes of act.
It is hereby declared that the practice of discrimination on the basis of race,
color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national origin in business establishments or
places of public accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state endangers the health, safety, and general welfare of this state and its inhabitants;
and that such discrimination in business establishments or places of public
accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state, violates the public
policy of this state. It is the purpose of this act to assure all citizens full and
equal availability of all goods, services and facilities offered by business establishments and places of public accommodation and enterprises regulated by
the state without discrimination because of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry,
or national origin. The rules of common law that statutes in derogation
thereof shall be strictly construed has no application to this act. This act shall
be liberally construed with a view to promote the policy and purposes of the
act and to promote justice. The remedies provided herein shall not be exclusive but shall be in addition to any other remedies available at law or equity.

13-7-2. Definitions.
(1) The term "place of public accommodation" includes every place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers its
services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee or charge, except,
any establishment located within a building which contains not more than
five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor Df
such establishment as his residence; provided that any place, establishment,
or facility that caters or offers its services, facilities, or goods to the general
public gratuitously shall be within the definition of this term if it receives any
substantial governmental subsidy or support; but the term shall not apply to
any institution, church, any apartment house, club, or place of accommodation
which is in its nature distinctly private except to the extent that it is open to
the public.
(2) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, organizations, corporations, labor unions, legal representatives,
trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, and other organized groups of
persons.
(3) "Enterprises regulated by the state" means:
(a) all institutions subject to regulation under the Utah Uniform Commercial Credit Code, Title 70B [Utah Consumer Credit Code, Title 70C];
(b) all places of business which sell beer to consumers or house a state
liquor store, as permitted by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Title
32A;
(c) all insurers regulated by the Insurance Code, Title 31A; and
(d) all public utilities subject to regulation under the Public Utilities
Act, Title 54.
History: L. 1965, ch. 174, § 2; 1973, ch. 18,
§ 2; 1985, ch. 242, § 2; 1987, ch. 92, § 23.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment redesignated the subsections and corrected statutory references.
Consumer Credit Code. — The reference

in Subsection (3)(a) to the Utah Uniform Commercial Credit Code, Title 70B, was presumably intended to refer to the Utah Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, which was Title 70B.
That title was repealed in 1985 and replaced
by Title 70C, the Utah Consumer Credit Code.

io-/-3.

£qual right in business establishments, places of
public accommodation, and enterprises regulated by the state.

All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal and are
entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges,
goods and services in all business establishments and in all places of public
accommodation, and by all enterprises regulated by the state of every kind
whatsoever, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion,
ancestry or national origin. Nothing in this act shall be construed to deny any
person the right to regulate the operation of a business establishment or place
of public accommodation or an enterprise regulated by the state in a manner
which applies uniformly to all persons without regard to race, color, sex,
religion, ancestry, or national origin; or to deny any religious organization the
right to regulate the operation and procedures of its establishments.

13-7-4. Business establishment, place of public accommodation, or enterprise regulated by the state denying rights deemed public nuisance — Investigation and conciliation — Action to enjoin — Civil
action for damages —. Expenses of defending action.
Any business establishment or place of public accommodation or enterprise
regulated by the state in which a violation of the rights provided in § 13-7-3 of
this act occurs is a public nuisance. The operator of any such business establishment or place of public accommodation or enterprise regulated by the
state shall be deemed guilty of maintaining a public nuisance and may be
enjoined as hereinafter provided.
(a) Upon application to the attorney general by any person denied the
rights guaranteed by § 13-7-3, the attorney general shall investigate and
seek to conciliate the matter.
(b) An action to enjoin any nuisance defined in this section may be
brought in the name of the state of Utah by the attorney general. Upon
the trial of the cause, on finding that the material allegations of the
complaint are true, the court shall order such nuisance to be abated, and
enjoin all persons from maintaining or permitting such nuisance. When
any injunction as herein provided has been granted it shall be binding
upon the defendant and shall act as an injunction in personam against
the defendant throughout the state.
(c) Any person who is denied the rights provided for in § 13-7-3 shall
have a civil action for damages and any other remedy available in law or
equity against any person who denies him the rights provided for in
§ 13-7-3 or who aids, incites or conspires to bring about such denial.
(d) Any business establishment or place of public accommodation or
enterprises regulated by the state charged with maintaining a public
nuisance in violation of this act, which is determined or found not to be in
violation of this act, may be awarded all actual and necessary expenses
incurred in defending such action, as determined and approved by the
court having jurisdiction of the matter.
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16-6-13.1. Clubs storing or permitting consumption of liquor on premises
—Bond—Filing of articles, bylaws and house rules—Federal malt liquor
revenue stamp—Establishment of state liquor store—Restrictions. (1)
Every social club, recreational or athletic association, or kindred association, incorporated under the provisions of this chapter, which now maintains or intends to maintain premises upon which liquor is or will be
stored or consumed must procure and file with the Utah liquor control commission and maintain thereafter a cash or corporate surety bond payable
to the state of Utah, in the amount of $7500. The bond shall be in any
form approved by the attorney general and shall be conditioned upon the
faithful compliance by the nonprofit corporation, its officers, agents, and
employees with the provisions of this chapter and the Utah Liquor Control
Act of 1969 as amended, and regulations of the commission adopted thereunder. No part of any cash bond so posted may be withdrawn either during
the period the license is in effect, or while revocation proceedings are pending against the licensee, or for a period of six months thereafter. A bond
filed by a licensee under the provisions of this section shall be forfeited if
the license of a licensee is finally revoked. Upon final revocation, the attorney general shall undertake necessary procedures to collect the bond
and pay the proceeds to the state treasurer.
(2) Each club or association required by this chapter to file a $7500
bond shall submit a copy of its articles, bylaws and house rules to the
Utah liquor control commission, and each club or association shall abide
by and conform to its articles, bylaws and house rules. A copy of the
articles, bylaws and house rules and any amendments thereto shall be kept
on file with the Utah liquor control commission at all times.
(3) All social clubs, recreational, athletic or kindred associations organized pursuant to this chapter which have procured and filed a $7,500 bond
as required by this section and which have on file with the Utah liquor
control commission a copy of their articles, bylaws and house rules, and
are abiding by them and the provisions of this chapter and the Utah Liquor
Control Act of 1969 and regulations of the commission adopted thereunder,
may hold a United States retail malt liquor revenue stamp and at the
same time permit members to have, hold, store or possess liquor in or on
premises described in such stamp.
(4) The so-called "locker system" for the storage and serving of
intoxicating liquors shall be legal in this state only when operated by a
nonprofit corporation in compliance with the terms and provisions of this
chapter and the provisions of the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, and
the regulations of the commission adopted thereunder.
(5) Under the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, the regulations
adopted thereunder, and the provisions of this chapter, the Utah liquor
control commission may establish a state store on premises of a social
club, recreation, athletic or other kindred association.
(6) Any social club, recreational, athletic, or other kindred association seeking to have a state liquor store located on its premises, shall have
a valid license issued by the Utah liquor control commission, file a written
application with the commission in the form prescribed, accompanied by
an application fee of $25, the written consent of the local authority as
defined in the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, satisfactory documentary
proof that the applicant is currently licensed to and does operate a place
where a variety of hot food is prepared and cooked and complete meals
are served in connection with indoor dining accommodations, satisfactory
proof that the applicant is in compliance with the provisions of this chapter
and the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, and the regulations adopted
thereunder, and that the proposed vendor can qualify for and obtain the
bond specified in section 32-1-37 of the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969.
Every application shall contain a scaled floor plan of the social club,
recreational, athletic, or other kindred association, including that part
thereof in which applicant proposes that a state store be established and
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shall set forth any other information as the commission may direct. If
state store is so established, liquor or wine may not be stored or sold i
any other place than as designated and approved by the commission.

(7) The Utah liquor control commission may refuse to locate a state
liquor store in any social club, recreational, athletic, or other kindred
association whose officer, director, managing agent or employee has been
convicted of a felony or of violation of any ordinance, state or federal law
concerning the sale, delivery or transportation of an alcoholic beverage, or
who has forfeited bond to appear in court to answer charges of having
committed a felony or having violalcd any such laws or ordinances, or has
pleaded guilty to a charge of having committed a felony, or has violated
any such law or ordinance, or who has been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
(8) In those instances where a slate liquor store is established on
premises occupied by a social club, recreational, athletic, or other kindred
association, the following restrictions shall apply:
(a) The state liquor store must remain locked at all times when it is
not open for business.
(b) The state store shall not stock or sell any liquor except in original
unbroken containers.
(c) No minor shall be employed by a*ny vendor to sell or dispense any
alcoholic beverage.
(d) No vendor, officer, director, managing agent or employee, nor
any other person employed by or acting for or in behalf of any licensee,
shall sell, deliver or furnish, or cause or permit to be sold, delivered or
furnished any liquor or wine t o :
(i) Any minor;
(ii) Any person actually, apparently or obviously d r u n k ;
(iii) Any known habitual drunkard ;
(iv) Any known interdicted person.
(e) Every lease, contract or other arrangement under which a state
store is established in a social club, recreational, athletic or other kindred
association shall be in writing and contain a provision to the effect that it
is terminable at the option of the state, with or without cause, and without liability of any kind to the state.
(f) There shall be no advertising or other rerference to the sale of
liquor, except as provided in section 32-1-36.5 (n).
(g) No liquor or wine shall be sold or offered for sale at said stores
during the following hours:
(i) On any day of a general or primary election until after the time
when the polls are closed.
(ii) On Sunday and legal holidays after 12:00 midnight and prior
to 12:00 noon.
(h) No provision in this act or the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969,
shall be construed to prevent a social club, recreational, athletic or other
kindred association which is licensed to and does operate a place where
a variety of hot food is prepared and cooked and complete meals are
served in connection with indoor dining accommodations, or a restaurant,
from purchasing, storinsr or usinsr flavoring and cooking wines, liqueur
and cordials for flavoring and cooking purposes, but no such wines, liqueurs
or cordials shall be sold as a beverage.
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32-1-3. Definitions.—As used in this act :
"Alcoholic beverage'' means and includes "beer'' and "liquor" as they
are defined herein.
"Application" means a formal written request for the issuance of a
permit or license.
"Beer" means any beverage containing not less than one-half of one per
centum of alcohol by weight and obtained by the alcoholic fermentation
of an infusion or decoction of any malted grain or similar products. "Heavy
beer" means beer containing more than 3.2 per centum of alcohol by weight.
"Light beer" means beer containing not more than 3.2 per centum of
alcohol by weight. Beer may or may not contain hops or other vegetable
products. "Beer" includes ale, stout and porter.
"Brewer" means any person engaged in manufacturing beer.
"Commission" means "Utah liquor control commission."
"Council" means citizens' council.
"Dentist" means a person holding a valid and unrevoked license to
practice dentistry under the laws of the state of Utah.
"Druggist" or "pharmacist" means any person holding a valid and
unrevoked license as a registered pharmacist under the laws of the state
of Utah and who is actually in good faith engaged in the business of
compounding and dispensing drugs or medicines.
"Drugstore" or "pharmacy" shall be as defined by the statutes of Utah.
"Interdicted person" means a person to whom the sale of liquor is prohibited by an order made under this act.
"Liquor" means and includes alcohol, or any alcoholic, spirituous,
vinous, fermented, malt, or other liquid or combination of liquids, a part
of which is spirituous, vinous, or fermented, and all other drinks or
drinkable liquids, containing more than one-half of one per centum of
alcohol by weight; and all mixtures, compounds or preparations, whether
liquid or not, which contain more than one-half of one per centum of alcohol
by weight, and which are capable of human consumption; except that
the term "liquor" shall not include "light beer."
"Local authority" means (a) the board of county commissioners of the
county in which the premises are located if the premises are located in an
unincorporated area of the county or (b) the governing body of the
city or town in which the premises are located if the premises are located
in an incorporated city or town.
"Manufacture" means to distill, brew, rectify, blend, mix, compound,
process, ferment, or otherwise make any alcoholic beverage as defined
in this act.
"Minor" means any person under the age of twenty-one years.
"Package" shall mean any container, bottle, vessel, or other receptacle
immediately containing liquor.
"Package agency" means an outlet authorized by the commission to sell
original package liquor or wine for consumption off the premises.
"Person" includes any individual, firm, copartnership, corporation, association, or any group or combination, and the plural as well as the singular number, unless the intent to give a more limited meaning is disclosed by
the context.
"Physician" means a person holding a valid and unrevoked license to
practice medicine and surgery in the state of Utah.
"Premises" means any room, enclosure, building or structure where
alcoholic beverages may be lawfully manufactured, stored, sold, or consumed
as provided in this act.
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"Prescription" means a writing in the form prescribed by the regulations, signed by a physician, and given by him to a patient for the obtaining
of liquor pursuant to this act for use for medicinal purposes only.
"Public place" shall mean and include any place, building or conveyance, to which the public has, or is permitted to have access, and any
highway, street, lane, park or place of public resort or amusement, and
any other place which, under the provisions of this act, has been declared to
be a public place.
"Regulations" means regulations made by the commission.
"Residence" means and includes any building, or part of a building,
where a person resides, but shall not include any part of a building which
is not actually and exclusively used as a private residence, nor any part of
a hotel other than a private guest room, nor a club or any part thereof,
nor any place from which there is access to a club or hotel except through
a street or lane or other open and unobstructed means of access, nor any
portion of a building used in part for business purposes unless such portion
is separated from the part used for business purposes by a wall or walls
having no doors or other means of access opening into such part used
for business purposes.
"Restaurant" means a place of business whore a variety of Lot food
is prepared and cooked and complete meals are served to the general
public in connection with indoor dining accommodations.
"Retailer" means any person engaged in the sale or distribution of
alcoholic beverages 1o the consumer.
"Sell" or "to sell" when used in this act in any prohibition, shall be construed to include: to solicit or receive an order for; to keep or expose for
sale; to deliver for value; to peddle; to possess with intent to sell; 1o
traffic in; for any consideration, promised or obtained, directly or indirectly,
or under any pretext or by any means whatsoever, to procure or allow
to be procured for any other person; and "sale." when so used, shall
include every act of selling as above defined.
"State store" shall mean an outlet for the sale of liquor located on
premises owned or leased by the state of Utah.
"Wholesaler" means any person other than a manufacturer, en erased
in the importation for sale, or in the sale of alcoholic beverages in wholesale or jobbincr quantities to the commission or to retailers.
"Wine" includes any alcoholic beverage obtained by the fermentation
of the natural sugar content of fruits, plants, honey or milk, whether or
not other ingredients are added.

(repealed)
32-1-36. State stores.—Unless otherwise prohibited, stores to be known
as state liquor stores may be established by the commission at such places
in the state as considered advisable for the sale of liquor in accordance
with the provisions of this act and the regulations made thereunder.
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32A-1-5.

Definitions.

As used in this title:
(41) "State store" means a facility for the sale of package liquor
located on premises owned or leased by the state of Utah and operated
by state employees. This term shall not apply to restaurants, private
clubs, or package agencies.
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UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Cooperating Attorneys for
UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS & LIBERTIES
FOUNDATION, INC.
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY

SANDRA BEYNON, personally and
on behalf of a class of
women similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

STATE OF UTAH

Civil No. 90 -

^

^

COMPLAINT
ST. GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE # 1743
BENEVOLENT & PROTECTIVE ORDER
OF ELKS,
Defendant.

(Hon. J. Philip Eves)

THE PLAINTIFF, SANDRA BEYNON, personally and on behalf
of a plaintiff class, by and through counsel BRIAN M.
BARNARD as a complaint and cause of action against the ST.
GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE # 1743 of the BENEVOLENT & PROTECTIVE
ORDER OF ELKS states as follows:

*:K - ^ '

PARTIES
1.

SANDRA BEYNON, the named plaintiff is a female

adult citizen and resident of the City of St. George,
Washington County and the State of Utah.
2.

ST. GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE // 1743, BENEVOLENT & PROTEC-

TIVE ORDER OF ELKS is a Utah non-profit corporation, affiliated with the national fraternal organization known as the
BENEVOLENT & PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS.

The ST. GEORGE-DIXIE

LODGE operates facilities located at 1225 No. 600 West, St.
George, Washington County, Utah,
3.

The BENEVOLENT & PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS is a

nationwide American fraternity which as been in existence
for more than one hundred and twenty (120+) years.

It

maintains and sanctions lodges or local chapters throughout
the United States of America, with approximately fourteen
(14) such lodges in Utah including the named defendant.
Women are not permitted to be members of the BENEVOLENT &
PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS and the defendant.

Section 14.010

of the Grand Lodge Statutes of the Benevolent & Protective
Order of Elks of the United States of America (the rules of
the nation organization which govern the defendant herein as
to membership) requires that an applicant for membership in
the national organization or a local Elks lodge must be a
male citizen of the United States of America.

2

JURISDICTION and VENUE
4.

This action is commenced pursuant to Ut. Code Ann.

§ 13-7-4(c) (1953 as amended).

Jurisdiction is proper in

this Court pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953 as
amended) and Art. VIII, § 5 of the Utah Constitution.
Injunctive relief is provided for by Ut. Code Ann. § 13-7-4
(1953 as amended), Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4.

Venue is proper

in this court pursuant to the provisions of Ut. Code Ann. §§
78-13-1 et seq. (1953 as amended).
5.

The Utah Alcoholic Beverage Control Department has

issued to the defendant lodge a license to operate a private
liquor club under the provisions of §§ 32A-5-1 et seq., Utah
Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

Pursuant to Utah statutes and

the policies of the defendant, members of the defendant and
their guests may purchase liquor through the defendant's
private liquor club facilities.
6.

The named defendant, pursuant to the Utah Alcoholic

Beverage Control Department, issuance of licenses to operate
as a private liquor club, does "house a state liquor store"
under the provisions of Ut. Code Ann. § 16-6-13.1, § 32-1-3
and § 32-1-36 (1953 as amended)(all repealed effective July
1, 1986) and as contemplated in the Utah Civil Rights Act,
Ut. Code Ann. § 13-7-2(3)(b) (1953 as amended).
7.

Defendant lodge, pursuant to the Utah Alcoholic

Beverage Control Department issuance of licenses to operate
3

as private liquor clubs, sells beer to persons who consume
beer under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-5-1 et
seq. (1953 as amended) and as contemplated in the Utah Civil
Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. § 13-7-2(3) (b) (1953 as amended).
8. Defendant lodge, pursuant to the Utah Alcoholic
Beverage Control Department authority, has been issued a
license, by the city, the town and/or the county in which it
is located, to sell beer to persons who consume beer under
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-5-1 et seq. (1953 as
amended) and as contemplated in the Utah Civil Rights Act,
Ut. Code Ann. § 13-7-2(3)(b) (1953 as amended).
9.

Defendant lodge operates a lodge facility in which

food and non-alcoholic beverages are served to consumers,
receptions are held, meetings and parties catered, etc.
These facilities are open to and may be used by the members
of the defendant lodge, their families and their guests.
10.

Defendant lodge is a "business establishment" as

governed by the Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §
13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended).
11.

Defendant lodge is a "enterprise regulated by the

state" pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Civil Rights
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended).
12.

On or about June 11, 1987 plaintiffs1 counsel

corresponded with the defendant through Utah State Special
Deputy Grand Exalted Ruler of the GRAND LODGE OF THE
4

BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS, United States of
America, Elton J. Thompson and Art Summers regarding the
defendant's policy of not allowing women to be members of
the Elks.

A true and correct copy of that letter from

plaintiffs1 counsel to Art Summers is attached, marked
Exhibit T 1 , and incorporated herein by reference.
13.

On or about July 31, 1987 the Utah State Special

Deputy Grand Exalted Ruler of the GRAND LODGE OF THE BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS, United States of America,
Elton J. Thompson, replied to plaintiffs' counsel regarding
that policy.

A true and correct copy of that letter to

plaintiffs' counsel from Mr. Thompson is attached, marked
Exhibit

f,

14.

R"f and incorporated herein by reference.
That reply (Exhibit "R") essentially stated that

the defendant and their national officers believe they are
"conducting their activities on conformance with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the law of Utah"
and that they would continue to refuse to allow women to be
members of the Elks and the defendant.
15.

On or about August 7, 1987 the named plaintiff

SANDRA BEYNON applied for membership in the ST. GEORGE DIXIE
LODGE #1743, of the BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS,
defendant herein.

A true and correct copy of her applica-

tion is attached, marked Exhibit "A-l" and
incorporated herein by reference.
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f,

A-2fl, and

16.

About September 29, 1987 the ST. GEORGE-DIXIE

LODGE #1743, benevolent and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS rejected the named plaintiff SANDRA BEYNON'S application for
membership in that lodge.

A true and correct copy of that

rejection letter is attached, marked Exhibit "N", and
incorporated herein by reference.
17.

(a)

A reason for the rejection of the membership

application of BEYNON is the named plaintiff's gender.

(b)

The only reason for the rejection of the named plaintiff's
membership application is her gender,

(c)

The named

plaintiff meets all criteria for membership except for
gender.

(d)

The two (2) Elks Club members listed as

references in paragraphs 14 and 16 of the plaintiff's
application (Exhibit "A-l") declined to serve as references
for the plaintiff's application solely because of the
plaintiff's gender, (e)

Even if the plaintiff SANDRA BEYNON

and her proposer had submitted with plaintiff's application
(Exhibit "A") the required Application Fee, the defendant
St. George-Dixie Lodge No. 1743, would have rejected that
application solely on the basis of plaintiff's gender.
18.

Plaintiff has been informed and therefore believes

that all Elks lodges in Utah refuse to admit women as
members.

That refusal is based upon Section 14.010 of the

Grand Lodge Statutes of the Benevolent and Protective Order

6

of Elks of the United States of America which requires that
an applicant for membership shall be male.
19.

Upon information and belief, because the above

cited rule of the national organization of the Elks prohibits women from being members, if a local Utah lodge (such as
defendant) admitted a woman that lodge would probably be
expelled from the national organization, therefore no woman
could be allowed to be a member of any local Elks lodge in
Utah.

CLASS DEFINITION
20.

The named plaintiff desires to represent a class

of female persons similarly situated in pursuit of this
action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
21.

The plaintiff class is defined as follows:

(a)

All adult female residents, citizens and

domiciliaries of Washington County and the State of Utah;
(b)

who, in the past desired, now desire or in the

future will desire to be a member of the named defendant
organization;
(c)

who qualify for membership in the defendant

organization in all respects except gender; and,
(d)

who have been or will be rejected by the defendant

for membership on the basis of gender.
7

22.

This class is appropriate under Rule 23 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

CAUSE OF ACTION
NAMED PLAINTIFF BEYNON
23.

The conduct of the defendant ST. GEORGE-DIXIE

LODGE # 1743, BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS toward
the named plaintiff BEYNON, as set forth above, constitutes
a violation of the Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann.
§13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended).

The plaintiff BEYNON is

entitled to declaratory relief to that affect.
24.

The conduct of the defendant ST. GEORGE-DIXIE

LODGE # 1743, BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS toward
the named plaintiff BEYNON in violation of the Utah Civil
Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended), as set forth above, has caused great harm, affront,
suffering and damage to the plaintiff BEYNON.
25.

The named plaintiff BEYNON has been informed and

believes that unless ordered to comply with the provisions
of the Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et
seq. (1953 as amended) the defendant will continue to
violate that statute.

The named plaintiff BEYNON, there-

fore, requests that a preliminary injunction and a permanent
injunction be issued against the defendant ST. GEORGE-DIXIE
LODGE # 1743, BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS
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ordering it to immediately comply with the provisions of the
Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et seq. (1953
as amended)t and to cease all gender-based discrimination
against her.

CAUSE OF ACTION
PLAINTIFF CLASS
26.

The conduct of the defendant in refusing to permit

women to be members of their BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER
OF ELKS lodges constitutes a violation of the Utah Civil
Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended) . The plaintiff class is entitled to declaratory relief
to that affect.
27.

The named plaintiff has been informed and believes

that unless ordered to comply with the provisions of the
Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et seq. (1953
as amended) , the defendant will continue to violate those
statutes as against all of the plaintiff class, therefore
requests a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction
be issued against defendant lodge of the BENEVOLENT and
PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS, ordering it*to comply with the
provisions of tha Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§
13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended), and not to discriminate
with regard to membership on the basis of gender as against
members of the plaintiff class.
9

RELIEF
NAMED PLAINTIFF
WHEREFORE, the named plaintiff, SANDRA BEYNON demands
the following relief:
1.

Declaratory relief that the conduct of the defen-

dant ST, GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE # 1743, BENEVOLENT and PROTEC
TECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS toward the named plaintiff constitutes
a violation of the Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§
13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended).
2.

A preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction

be issued against the defendant ST. GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE
1743 of the BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS ordering
it to immediately comply with the provisions of the Utah
Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as
amended), and to cease all gender-based discrimination
against the named plaintiff, BEYNON.
3.

For the costs of this action and such other and

further relief as the Court deems ;ust and proper in the
premises.

PLAINTIFF CLASS
4.

For an order allowing this matter to proceed as a

plaintiff class action under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
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5.

For declaratory relief determining that the conduct

of the defendant in 'refusing to allow plaintiff class
members to be members of its lodge of the Benevolent and
Protective Order of Elks Lodges, constitutes a violation of
the Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut, Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et seq.
(1953 as amended)•
6.

For a preliminary injunction and a permanent

injunction issued against the defendant lodge ordering it to
immediately comply with the provisions of the Utah Civil
Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended) , and not to discriminate with regard to membership on
the basis of gender against members of the plaintiff class.
7.

For the costs of this action and such other and

further relief as the Court deems just and proper in the
premises.
DATED this 9th day of APRIL, 1990.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
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Jwne 11 1 1987

Art Summers
Utah State Director
BENEVOLENT & PROTECTIVE
ORDER OF ELKS
632 N. Main Street
Logan, Utah 84321
RE:

MEMBERSHIP RESTRICTIONS
ELKS LODGES in UTAH

Dear Mr. Summers:
I represent two (2) women who have approached me about
instituting legal action against the St. George-Dixie Elks
Lodge, 111 US. and the Elks Lodge #85f in Salt Lake County.
My clients wish to become Elks in order to partake of the
social and community service nature11of the organization. and
to participate in the "private club aspects of the local
lodges. Roth were dismayed to discover membership is
limited to men.
The Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. $§13-7-1 ct
scq 11953 as amended) prohibits
gender
discrimination in
19
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"business establishments
and
by
all
enterprises
regulated
by the state.11 Under the Civil Rights Act each Elks Lodge
in Utah is a "business establishment" and, if it sells beer
or operates as a private liquor club,
qualifies as an
"enterprise regulated by the state.1*
To enforce the provisions of the Utah Civil Rights Act
1 intend to commence a state wide class action lawsuit
against every Elks Lodge in Utah (which has a private club
liquor license) on behalf of each woman interested in
becoming an Elk. Given the recent United States Supreme
Court decision regarding the Duarte Rotary Club in
California and a similar case now pending before the Utah
Supreme Court against the ALTA CLUB
in Salt Lake City, the
legal precedent is in my clients1 favor.

My clients want to avoid litigation. If, within two
(2) weeks,1 steps can be taken toward ending the Utah Elks*
unlawful gender discrimination, litigation can be avoided.
Please let me know what your position is.
SJACereJ^yourXy 7
/lJRIAN \f. \BAJHfARD
Attorney at Law.
pdq/BMB
cc:

Clients
D.C. Bulloch, St George, Utah •
Clyde S. Pierce, Salt Lake City, Utah
David Wilkinson, Attorney General
Salt Lake City, Utah

2750 take V * w Av<
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KLKS

ALTON J. THOMPSON
Special Deputy Grand Exalted Ruler

33 South Uth East Street
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84103

July 31, 1987

Mr* Brian Barnard
Utah Legal Clinic
2Ui East 5th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 81*111
Dear Sir:
As I previously advised you, I would reply back to you
concerning your letter of Juno 11, 1907, and subsequent
communication of July 21*
1 wish to advise you that it is the position of the SUc
lodges concornod, supported by nil lodges in Utah, that they
are conducting their activities in conformance with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the laws of Utah*
Tho Benevolent and Protective Order of Elk3 is an American
fraternity in existence for more than U 9 years and desixes to
remain as a fraternal organization*
It is further the position of our ladies that they wish to
riaintain their own private organization without male members*
lk>th groups claim this right to determine what their membership
qualifications and procedures should be*
Respectfully,

Alton J, Thompson, SDGER

«•£?! 1^1*/"*!*
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CCS

Hon. Francis M# Smith, PGER
Hon. Robert A# Yothers, PGER
Hon. Gerald Strohm, PGER
Hon. David Wilkinson
Utah Elks Association
Utah Ladies Of Elks Association
All Utah Elk Lodges
D O E S Drove #27
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Benevolent end Protective order of Elks
P.O. Box 1450
ST. GEORGE, UTAH • 84770
Phone (801J 873-1743

September 29 f 1987

P. Lang Foremaster
165 North 100 East
St, Georget Utah 84770
Dear Brother Foremaster:
Persuant to Section 14,010 Grand Lodge Statutes of the
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the United States
of America an applicant for membership shall be:
(a) A Male citizen of the United States of America,
(b) Line 14 of the application for membership the two
references have declined in writing to be a reference
on the subject application. Also on item 16 the same
applies.
According to Article X, Section 1 of the By Laws and Rules of
Order of St. George "Dixie" Utah Lodge 01743, the proper application fee was not submitted.
In accordance with the above information we are hereby returning
the application which you submitted.

Sincerely and fraternallyt

W, W. Cannon, Jr.^Secretary

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDRA BEYNON,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
S T . GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE #174 3
BENEVOLENT & PROTECTIVE ORDER
OF ELKS,

Civil No, 900503229
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on October 30, 1991,
for hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
present and represented by

The plaintiff was

Brian M. Barnard, her attorney.

defendant was represented by Glenn C. Hanni, its attorney.

The
The

Court heard oral argument and took the matter under submission.
Being now fully advised in the premises the Court enters the
following decision and order.
By her complaint in this matter plaintiff seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief for the reason that she has
been denied membership in the defendant Elks Lodge (hereinafter
"Lodge").

Plaintiff alleges that the denial violates the Utah

Civil Rights Act, U.C.A. 13-7-1 et sea.

The facts are not in

dispute insofar as they are material to a determination of the

issues in t h i s case-

The p a r t i e s so s t i p u l a t e d a t t h e O c t o b e r

30, 1991 h e a r i n g .
FACTS
1. On or about August 7, 1987, plaintiff, a female,
applied for membership in the Lodge.
2.

On or about September 29, 1987, the Lodge rejected

plaintiff's application solely on the basis that plaintiff is
female.
3.

Lodge is an organization' which has selective

criteria for its membership and is not open to the general
public.
4.

Membership in the Lodge requires that one:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Be a male American citizen
Be 21 years of age or older
Have a belief in God
Have never committed a crime
Be a non-communist
Be sponsored by at least two members
of the Lodge
g. Be willing to uphold the Constitution
and laws of the United States of
America
h. Be willing to pledge allegiance to
the United States and salute the flag
i. Be of good character
j . Promote fellowship amongst members
of the defendant organization.

5.

Lodge is a private, fraternal club not open to

the general public.
6.

Lodge sells beer pursuant to a proper license.

7.

Lodge is a licensee or permittee of the State of

Utah for purposes of selling liquor on its premises.
8.

Lodge does not sell beer or liquor to the general

public, nor does it offer its other services and activities to
the general public, but only to its members and their guests.
9.

Lodge is a non-profit organization under the laws

of the State of Utah.
10.

Lodge does not engage in business for profit.
ANALYSIS

The cross Motions for Summary Judgment turn on the
question of whether the Utah Civil Rights Act applies to Lodge.
The parties agree that if the Act applies to Lodge, then
plaintiff is entitled to relief.

Likewise, if the Act does not

apply to Lodge, plaintiff's Complaint must fail.
presents the rather narrow question:

The case

Is Lodge an "Enterprise

regulated by the state" within the meaning of U.C.A. 13-7-2 (3)
(b)?

Neither party has presented any authority indicating that

this issue has been addressed by any appellate court.
Section 13-7-1 U.C.A. makes the Utah Civil Rights Act
applicable to all enterprises regulated by the state and would
prohibit gender discrimination by those enterprises.
"Enterprises regulated by the state" means:
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{b} all places of business which sell beer to
consumers or house a state liquor store, as
permitted by the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Act, Title 32A; " [ U.C.A. 13-7-2 (3)(b)]

The parties agree that Lodge sells beer to consumers
and disagree whether Lodge houses a state liquor store.

Since

the statute speaks in the disjunctive, it is of no import whether
Ledge houses a state liquor store.

It is enough that it sells

beer.
The real question is whether Lodge is a "place of
business" within the meaning of the statute.
is especially difficult to define.
definite or legal meaning.
p. 248) .

The term business

The term itself has no

(Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition,

It is obviously a broad term capable of different

meanings in different contexts.

The legislature did not define

the word or the phrase when it was placed in the statute.
Utah Court decision supplies the definition.

No

It is left to this

Court to state the definition as a matter of first impression.
In determining the meaning of "place of business", the
Court is influenced by rulings of other Courts.

In Schwenk v.

B.S.A. , 551 P. 2d, 465 (Oregon, 1976) the Oregon Supreme Court
ruled that the Boy Scouts of America was not a business subject
to Oregon's civil rights act because it was not a commercial
enterprise which offers goods or services to the public.

efendants have cited several cases from other jurisdictions, State
nd Federal, which seem to apply a similar definition for purposes of
ivil rights acts.
This Court is persuaded that the legislature intended to
irohibit gender discrimination in all places where commercial
LCtivities for purposes of making monetary profit and offered to the
feneral public are being conducted.

The Lodge is a non-profit

>rganization, does not operate to create monetary profits, and is not
>pen to the general public.
Accordingly, the Court Denies plaintiff's Motion and
Grants defendant's Motion.

Summary Judgment is Granted to defendant.

Plaintiff's Complaint is Ordered Dismissed.
Dated this

*r{dL

day of November, 1991.

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that on t h i s

day of

November, 1991, I mailed true and correct copies of the above
and foregoing Memorandum Decision to the following:

Brian M. Barnard, Esq.
Utal Legal Clinic
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Glenn C. Hanni, Esq.
600 Boston .Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Onfirfivh.

Jl/7ii^

Glenn C. Hanni, A1327
G. Eric Nielson, 5327
STRONG £ HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor 3oston Building
Salt Lake Ciry, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE FIFTE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 0£ WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SANDRA BEYNON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

J U D G M E N T

ST. GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE # 1 7 4 3 ,
BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE
ORDER OF ELKS,

Civil NO. r;gS-?I81>
Honorable J. Philip Eves

Defendant.

Plainriff's motion for summary judgment and defendant's
motion for summary judgment came on for hearing before the court
on Ocroher 20, 1991.
Brian M. 3arnard.

Plaintiff was represented by her attorney,

Defendant was represented by its at-iom^y,

Glenn C. Hanni of ~he firm of Strong £ Eanni.. Depositions of
various witnesses were filed with the cler): and were ordered
opened and published.

The court having considered -he records,

files, depositionsr briefs, and having heard arguments of counsel,
and having made and entered its Memorandum Decision on the 4th
day of November, IS91, and being fully advised,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1.

For the reasons stated in the court's Memorandum

Decision dated November 4, 1991, the motion of plaintiff for
summary judgment is hereby deniedP and the motion of defendant
for summary judgment is hereby granted.
2.

Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendant

St, George-Dixie Lodge #1743, Benevolent and Protective Order of
Elks and against the plaintiff Sandra Bevnon, no cause of action.
3.

Defendant is hereby awarded its costs*i^ ^ ^ amounfe

of $
Dated thiis

£> —

day of •Movombcr, 1991.

BY THE COURT:

PhiTip E v ^ , Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of October, 1991,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment,
first-class postage prepaid, to:
Brian M. Barnard
Utah Legal Clinic
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah

<US«3SM
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84111-3204

(LLP J^'rtOCC'

UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS &
LIBERTIES FOUNDATION, INC.
by COOPERATING ATTORNEYS
BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
JOHN PACE
USB #5624
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111 - 3204
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY

SANDRA BEYNON, personally and
on behalf of a class of female
persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

STATE OF UTAH

s
;
::

Civil No.
90-050-3229

vs.
:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

:

(Hon. J. Phillip
Eves)

ST. GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE # 1743,
BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER
OF ELKS,
Defendants.

THE NAMED PLAINTIFF, SANDRA BEYNON, by and through
counsel, hereby gives notice of her appeal of the Memorandum
Decision dated November 4, 1991 herein (copy attached as
Exhibit "D") and the Order Granting Summary Judgment herein
(copy attached as Exhibit "S") denying plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment and granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's complaint.

Plaintiff also appeals the order and decision (copy
attached as Exhibit "C") of the Court denying plaintiff's
motion to certify that above matter as a plaintiff class
action under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
This appeal is to the Utah Supreme Court.
DATED this 5th day of DECEMBER, 1991.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
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CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1991,
I caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing
NOTICE OF APPEAL to:
JAN GRAHAM
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorneys General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
counsel for an interested party, and to:
GLEN C. HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
STRONG & HANNI
6th Floor
BOSTON BUILDING
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC

1ARD,
for Plaintiffs
bmb\beynappe.not\elks
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13-7-1

COMMERCE AND TRADE

13-7-1. Policy and purposes of act
It is hereby declared that the practice of discrimination on the basis of race,
color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national origin in business establishments or
places of public accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state endangers the health, safety, and general welfare of this state and its inhabitants;
and that such discrimination in business establishments or places of public
accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state, violates the public
policy of this state. It is the purpose of this act to assure all citizens full and
equal availability of all goods, services and facilities offered by business establishments and places of public accommodation and enterprises regulated by
the state without discrimination because of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry,
or national origin. The rules of common law that statutes in derogation
thereof shall be strictly construed has no application to this act. This act shall
be liberally construed with a view to promote the policy and purposes of the
act and to promote justice. The remedies provided herein shall not be exclusive but shall be in addition to any other remedies available at law or equity.
History: L. 1965, ch. 174, s i; 1973, ch. 18,
§ 1.
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this
act" refers to Laws 1965, ch. 174, which
enacted this section and §§ 13-7-2 to 13-7-4.

Cross-References. — Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, §§ 34-35-1 to 34-35-8.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note: State Legislative Response to the Federal Civil Rights Act
A Proposal, 9 Utah L. Rev. 434.
Am. Jur. 2d. —15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights
§ 16 et seq.
C.J.S. — 14 CJ.S. Civil Rights §§ 6-11,
14-21.
A.L.R. — Actionability under state statutes
of discrimination because of complaining
party's association with persons of different
race, color, or the like, 35 A.LJl.3d 859.
Discrimination on basis of illegitimacy as denial of constitutional rights, 38 A.L.R.3d 613.
Constitutionality of enactment or regulation
forbidding or restricting employment of aliens
in public employment or on public works, 38
A.L.R.3d 1213.
Recovery of damages for emotional distress
resultingfromracial, ethnic, or religious abuse
or discrimination, 40 A.L.R.3d 1290.
Construction and operation of "equal opportunity clause" requiring pledge against racial
discrimination in hiring under construction
contract, 44 AJLR.3d 1283.
Racial or religious discrimination in furnishing of public utilities, services, or facilities, 53
A.L.R.3d 1027.
Validity in application of provisions governing determination of residency for purpose of
fixing fee differential for out-of-state students
in public college, 56 A.LJUd 641.

Recovery of damages for emotional distress
resultingfromdiscrimination because of sex or
marital status, 61 A.LJL3d 944.
Trailer park as place of public accommodation within meaning of state civil rights statutes, 70 A.L.R.3d 1142.
Recovery of damages as remedy for wrongful
discrimination under state or local civil rights
provisions, 85 A.LJL3d 351.
State law prohibiting sex discrimination as
violated by dress or grooming requirements for
customers of establishments serving food or
beverages, 89 A.L.R.3d 7.
Prohibition, under state civil rights laws, of
racial discrimination in rental of privately
owned residential property, 96 AJLR.3d 497.
Identification of job seeker by race, religion,
national origin, sex, or age, in "situation
wanted" employment advertising as violation
of state civil rights laws, 99 A.L.R.3d 154.
On-the-job sexual harassment as violation of
state civil rights law, 18 A.L.R.4th 328.
What constitutes illegal discrimination under state statutory prohibition against discrimination in housing accommodations on account
of marital status, 33 A.LR.4th 964.
Race as factor in adoption proceedings, 34
A.L.R.4th 167.
Exclusion or expulsion from association or
club as violation of state civil rights act, 38
AJLJUth 628.
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13-7-2. Definitions.
(1) The term "place of public accommodation** includes every place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers its
services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee or charge, except,
any establishment located within a building which contains not more than
five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of
such establishment as his residence; provided that any place, establishment,
or facility that caters or offers its services, facilities, or goods to the general
public gratuitously shall be within the definition of this term if it receives any
substantial governmental subsidy or support; but the term shall not apply to
any institution, church, any apartment house, club, or place of accommodation
which is in its nature distinctly private except to the extent that it is open to
the public.
(2) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, organizations, corporations, labor unions, legal representatives,
trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, and other organized groups of
persons.
(3) "Enterprises regulated by the state" means:
(a) all institutions subject to regulation under the Utah Uniform Commercial Credit Code, Title 70B [Utah Consumer Credit Code, Title 70C];
(b) all places of business which sell beer to .consumers or house a state
liquor store, as permitted by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Title
32A;
(c) all insurers regulated by the Insurance Code, Title 31A; and
(d) all public utilities subject to regulation under the Public Utilities
Act, Title 54.
History: L. 1965, ch. 174, $ 2; 1973, ch. 18,
§ 2; 1985, ch. 242, $ 2; 1987, ch. 92, § 23.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment redesignated the subsections and corrected statutory references.
Consumer Credit Code. — The reference

in Subsection (3)(a) to the Utah Uniform Com*
mercial Credit Code, Title 70B, was presum*
ably intended to refer to the Utah Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, which was Title 70B.
That title was repealed in 1985 and replaced
by Title 70C, the Utah Consumer Credit Code.

13-7-3. Equal right in business establishments, places of
public accommodation, and enterprises regulated by the state.
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal and are
entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges,
goods and services in all business establishments and in all places of public
accommodation, and by all enterprises regulated by the state of every kind
whatsoever, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion,
ancestry or national origin. Nothing in this act shall be construed to deny any
person the right to regulate the operation of a business establishment or place
669

13-7-4

COMMERCE AND TRADE

of public accommodation cr an enterprise regulated by the state in a manner
which applies uniformly to all persons without regard to race, color, sex,
religion, ancestry, or national origin; or to deny any religious organization the
right to regulate the operation and procedures of its establishments.
History: L. 1965, ch. 174, § 3; 1973, ch. 18,
S3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Massage regulation.
County ordinance prohibiting massages by
members of the opposite sex, with certain ex-

ceptions, did not violate this section. Redwood
Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 624 P.2d
1138 (Utah 1981).

13-7-4. Business establishment, place of public accommodation, or enterprise regulated by the state denying rights deemed public nuisance — Investigation and conciliation — Action to enjoin — Civil
action for damages — Expenses of defending action.
Any business establishment or place of public accommodation or enterprise
regulated by the state in which a violation of the rights provided in § 13-7-3 of
this act occurs is a public nuisance. The operator of any such business establishment or place of public accommodation or enterprise regulated by the
state shall be deemed guilty of maintaining a public nuisance and may be
enjoined as hereinafter provided.
(a) Upon application to the attorney general by any person denied the
rights guaranteed by § 13-7-3, the attorney general shall investigate and
seek to conciliate the matter.
(b) An action to enjoin any nuisance defined in this section may be
brought in the name of the state of Utah by the attorney general. Upon
the trial of the cause, on finding that the material allegations of the
complaint are true, the court shall order such nuisance to be abated, and
enjoin all persons from maintaining or permitting such nuisance. When
any injunction as herein provided has been granted it shall be binding
upon the defendant and shall act as an injunction in personam against
the defendant throughout the state.
(c) Any person who is denied the rights provided for in § 13-7-3 shall
have a civil action for damages and any other remedy available in law or
equity against any person who denies him the rights provided for in
§ 13-7-3 or who aids, incites or conspires to bring about such denial.
(d) Any business establishment or place of public accommodation or
enterprises regulated by the state charged with maintaining a public
nuisance in violation of this act, which is determined or found not to be in
violation of this act, may be awarded all actual and necessary expenses
incurred in defending such action, as determined and approved by the
court having jurisdiction of the matter.
History: L. 1965, ch. 174, § 4; 1973, ch. 18,
§ 4.
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this

act" refers to Laws 1965, ch. 174, which
enacted this section and §§ 13-7-1 to 13-7-3.
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ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OP
^
ST G E 0 R G E ..DJXIE" LODGE. NO. 1743
EENEVpLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER OP ELKS
OP THE UNITED STATES OP AMERICA

£••*.££

KNOW A L L M E N BY THESE PRESENTS:
That w e , the undersigned, have t h i s ^ f r ^ day of October, 1969,
voluntarily-associated ourselves together for the purpose of form-)
ing a non-profit corporation under the laws of the State of Utah,
and w e hereby certify:
PIRST:
"St. George

That the name of said non-profit corporation shall bej
f

Dixie 1 Lodge No, 1743, Benevolent and Protective

Order of E l k s of the United States of America."
SECOND:

That the purposes for which said Corporation is

formed a r e :
(a) The primary purpose for which this Corporation is
formed is to inculcate the principles of charity, justice, brother)ly love and fidelity; to promote the welfare and enhance the
happiness of its' members; to quicken the spirit of American
patriotism; to cultivate good fellowship and to perpetuate itself
as a fraternal organization.
(b) Other purposes for which this Corporation is
formed are:

To do all the acts and things, and business and

businesses in any manner connected with the objects or purposes oij
powers of the Corporation, or necessary, incidental, convenient oij
auxiliary thereto, to calculate directly or indirectly to promote
the interests, objectives and ideals of the organization,* and in
addition, to have and exercise all rights, powers, and privileges
now or hereafter belonging to or conferred upon non-profit
corporations existing under the laws of the State of Utah.
i

(c) The foregoing statement of purpose or purposes
<ETT ft PICKETT

shall be construed as a statement of both purpose and powers and

rORNCVS AT L A W
C C FtCKCTT BUOO.
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the purposes and powers in each clause shall, except where otherwise expressed, be in nowise limited or restricted by reference tol
or inference from the terms or provisions of any other clause, but]
shall be regarded as independent purposes and powers.
THIRD:

This Corporation is organized exclusively as a

fraternal organization, as a non-profit corporation, and its
activities shall be conducted for the aforesaid purposes in such
manner that no part of its net earnings will inure to the benefit
of any member, director, trustee, officer or individual,
FOURTH:

That said Corporation is organized pursuant to the

General Non-profit Corporation Law.
FIFTH:

That the principal office for the transaction of

business of the Corporation is to be located invthe County of
Washington, City of St. George, Utah.
SIXTH:

The officers, directors and trustees of this

corporation, their nominations, election or appointment, installatlion, power and authority shall be in accordance with the provisions
of the By-Laws of this Corporation.
(b)

The governing body of this Corporation shall be its!

Board of Director^, which said Board of Directors shall consist of)
all of the following:

The officers of the Corporation, who are

entitled EXALTED RULER, ESTEEMED LEADING KNIGHT, ESTEEMED LOYAL
OIGHT, ESTEEMED LECTURING KNIGHT,

and five (5) persons who shall]

bear the title of Trustee.
(c)

The names and addresses of the persons who are to

act in the capacity of directors of this Corporation until the
selection of their successors are as follows:
NAME
Samuel T. Fillmore
William Palmer
KCTT * PICKETT
TORMSYS A T LAW
CK. FtCKKTT B L O t t .
. G C O R C C . UTAH

Loy V7. Taylor

ADDRESS
349 North 200 West
St. George, Utah
P.O. Box 176
Mesquite, Nevada
45 E. 100 Uo.
St. George, Utah

Kenneth Christensen
Blair Turnbeaugh
Ted Jones
Vaughn Kelly
Neal Lundberg
Harold Furrow
Howard Hall
SEVENTH:

255 North 200 West
St. George, Utah
168 North 100 East
St. George, Utah
285 North 400 West
St. George, Utah
North Bluff Street
St. George, Utah
568 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah
Leeds, Utah
432 West 600 North
St. George, Utah

That the By-Laws of said Corporation shall define

the duties of the directors, officers and trustees of the
Corporation; that the manner of election and term of office of
the directors, officers and trustees of the Corporation shall be
as set forth in the By-Laws of the Corporation; that the number
of persons to serve in the capacity of directors may be changed
from time to time by the By-Laws of said Corporation, and that
said Corporation is hereby granted authority to make a Code of
By-Laws for its government, and to amend the same from time to
time as provided in said By-Laws.
EIGHT:

This Corporation is organized with the permission of

the Grand Lodge of the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of
the United States of America, and the business of the Corporation
and all its acts, decisions and other actions of its officers and
members in carrying out its purposes and powers shall at all time^
conform with the provisions of the Grand Lodge Constitution and
Statutes of the Order enacted pursuant thereto as well as the
provisions of State Law.
NINTH:

In all matters relating to property, both real and

personal, including but not limited to, purchase, sale, mortgage,
hiring and leasing, the provisions of Section 208, Grand Lodge
Statutes relating to notice and required vote shall be fully
:KETT * PICKETT
r r O R M C Y S AT CAW
ICC. PICKCTT • C D C .
T. G C O * a C . UTAH

complied with.

TENTH:

The term of this corporation shall be perpetual,

ELEVENTH:

The Corporation shall have members and a persons

eligibility to become a member shall be as set forth in the By-Lawjs
of the Corporation.
IN WITNESS WHEEEOP, we have hereunto set our hands this Z^jTh\
day of October, 1969.

^ZMry CO J cyX^>

STATE OP UTAH

)
:ss.

COUNTY OP WASHINGTON )

I, -&AJi)€,-?-/> <£.C6MJT*JLJS**J> a Notary Public, hereby certify
that on the fO&'ff
before me X 9\I

day of October, 1969, personally appeared

UJ'/ Ay

/ffc>

who being duly sworn by me, declared

that he is the person who signed the foregoing document as an
incorporator and that the statements therein contained are true,
IN WITNESS WHEEEOP, I have hereunto set my hand and seal
this

^2^7-^day of October, 1969.

EESIICNG:
My commission expires:

•iCKrrr * FICKOT
ATTORNEY* AT LAW
' C r t C C . PICKETT « L O O .
ST. OKOR6C U T A H

St. Geoige, Utah

STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
DfVlSION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL CODE
wrebjDs certify^ that r the foregoing, J* ^ • true
hereb]
;opy
md the endorsements thereon, as the aame ia
aKen from and compared with -IffS PV0»nal tiled
i the office of this Division on the ,
lay of
.A.D.
_and
iow remainlg on file and of record therein.
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April 14, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
As the Official Officer and Secretary of the Utah State
Senate, I do attest to and certify that the attached transcript of
HB No. 311, DISCRIMINATION ON BASIS OF SEX, is a true and actual
record taken from the Official Senate Recordings, #320, March 8,
1973.
Respectfully submitted,

Sophia C. Buckmiller
Official Officer and
Secretary, Utah State Senate
My Commission expires
May 1, 1987

Senator Howe:

Mr* President, I was just calling

Representative Urie to see if she wanted to come over and explain
it [H.B. No. 311] —

but, I think it f s rather self-explanatory.

The purpose of it is, I think, to put into our law, a prohibition
against discrimination on account of sex.
on —

We already have it

that we can't discriminate on the basis of race, color,

religion, ancestry, national origin; but it was not discrimination on the basis of sex was not included, in this
written law, which was passed in 1965.

This is the law, the

antidiscrimination law really of 1965.

Then I note also that it

includes not only places of public accommodation but in
enterprises regulated by the state.

Now I'm not just sure,

frankly, what that means, "enterprises regulated by the state,"
but I suppose that it would be
Senate President:

—

It's - the explanation is on the

next page, Senator Howe.
Senator Howe:

Oh.

Senate President:
everybody . . •
Senator Howe:

Line 19. [Pause]

That's right.

Just about

In other words, it just,

applies, prohibits discrimination generally against women.
not doing —

We're

discriminating now anyhow so this bill won't hurt

anybody.
Senate President:
can you tell me for sure
Senator Howe:

I'm, I'm not sure about one thing

—

—

About what?

Senate President:

I almost hate to mention it —

but,

the only place I know of, is the Alta Club that has a separate
entrance for women

—

[laughter]
Senator Howe:

This, this may change that

Senator [not identified]:
President:

—

Mr* President • . •

Senator

Sen-tor [not identified]:

Senator Howe, are you open

for question?
Senator Howe:

I will.

Senator [not identified]:

Senator Howe, it seem to me,

that on the Equal Rights Amendment, that the place we got into
trouble was where there might be additional responsibilities
under the law, to women.

Now this pretty well confines it to the

idea that you can't discriminate against a woman as far as taking
away privileges and so we're not really talking about the same
thing here are we?
Senator Howe:
limited.

No.

This, this is just much, much

This isn't the whole area like the E.R.A. was.
•

• • •

Discrimination on Basis of Sex:

Hearing on H.B. 311,

40th Leg., 1973 Utah Laws 33 (statements of Sen. Warren E. Pugh,
President, and Sen.

Richard C. Howe).

16-6-22. General powers.
Each nonprofit corporation shall have power:
(1) to have perpetual succession by its corporate name unless a limited
period of duration is stated in its articles of incorporation.
(2) to sue and be sued, complain and defend, in its corporate name.
(3) to have a corporate seal which may be altered at pleasure, and to
use the same by causing it, or a facsimile thereof, to be impressed or
affixed or in any other manner reproduced.
(4) to purchase, take, receive, lease, take by gift, devise or bequest, or
otherwise acquire, own, hold, improve, use and otherwise deal in and with
real or personal property, or any interest therein, wherever situated.
(5) to sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, transfer and otherwise dispose of all or any part of its property and assets.
(6) to lend money to its employees other than its officers and trustees.
(7) to purchase, take, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire, own,
hold, vote, use, employ, sell, mortgage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dispose
of, and otherwise use and deal in and with, shares or other interests in, or
obligations of, other domestic or foreign corporations, whether for profit
or not for profit, associations, partnerships or individuals, or direct or
indirect obligations of the United States, or of any other government,
state, territory, governmental district or municipality or of any instrumentality thereof.
(8) to make contracts and incur liabilities, borrow money at such rates
of interest as the corporation may determine, issue its notes, bonds, and
other obligations, and secure any of its obligations by mortgage or pledge
of all or any of its property, franchises* and income.
(9) to lend money for its corporate purposes, invest and reinvest its
funds, and take and hold real and personal property as security for the
payment of funds so loaned or invested.
(10) to conduct its affairs, transact its business, carry on its operations,
and have offices and exercise the powers granted by this act in any state,
territory, district, or possession of the United States, or in any foreign
country.
(11) to elect or appoint officers and agents of the corporation, and define their duties and fix their compensation.
(12) to make and alter bylaws, or resolutions, not inconsistent with its
articles of incorporation or with the laws of this state, for the administration and regulation of the affairs of the corporation.
(13) unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, to make
donations for the public welfare or for religious, charitable, scientific or
educational purposes; and in time of war to make donations in aid of war
activities.
(14) to indemnify any trustee or officer or former trustee or officer of
the corporation, or any person who may have served at its request as a
trustee, director or officer of another corporation, whether for profit or not
for profit, against expenses actually and necessarily incurred by him in
connection with the defense of any action, suit or proceeding in which he
is made a party by reason of being or having been such trustee, director or
officer, except in relation to matters as to which he shall be adjudged in
such action, suit or proceeding to be liable for negligence or misconduct in
the performance of duty; but such indemnification shall not be deemed
exclusive of any other rights to which such trustee, director or officer may
be entitled, under any bylaw, agreement, vote of the governing board or
members or otherwise.
(15) to voluntarily dissolve and distribute its assets in accordance with
the provisions of this act.
(16) to have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to effect
any or all of the purposes for which the corporation is organized, including the right to raise funds by such means or methods as the governing
board may deem advisable, not inconsistent with law or its articles of
incorporation or bylaws.
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RECEIPT NO.

2Q8<)2

Utah Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control
Period effective
0 7 / 0 1 / 8 9 TO 0 6 / 3 0 / 9 0

THIS LICENSE ENTITLES

License No,
CLOO65

S t . George D i x i e Lodge #17^3* BPOB

doing business as. E l k s 17143
located at 1225 No, 600 W«
S t . George t UT 8U770
TO OPERATE AS A PRIVATE CLUB ALLOWING THE STORAGE, SALE AND
CONSUMPTION OF LIQUOR PURSUANT TO SECTION 3 2 A - 5 , tTCAH CODE
ISSUED BY THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL ON
THIS 16TH DAY OF JUNE
1969

This license Is not transferable and shall be
conspicuously displayed in licensed premises.

UTAH DE*ARTMENT OF
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONtKOL

gr

DIRE'

1) This license allows the private club to:
a) purchase liquor from the department and store it in lockable areas as designated
on floor plan filed with department;
b) sell and serve liquor to members, visitors and guests at prices fixed by the
department, provided liquor shall not be sold between the hours of 12 00 midnight
and 12 00 noon on Sundays and holidays, nor between the hours of 1 00 am and
10 00 am on all other days,
c) utilize alcoholic flavorings only as secondary ingredient, which flavorings shall
be properly labeled and stored in lockable areas.
2) Financial records, monthly statements and membership records shall be maintained and
made available to the department upon request
The department shall be notified
immediately upon any change in officers, leases, management contracts, articles of
incorporation, bylaws or house rules (set up charges).
3) Renewal of this license requires submitting an application and $750 annual fee by
May 31, 1990, otherwise said licence will be automatically forfeited effective
June 30, 1990.

010209

ST. GEORGE CITY BUSINESS LICENSE
THIS CERTIFIES
That

DIXIE

ELKS LCDGE

(BEER)

has paid the required License fee and is here by authorized to carry on business in the city of
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MEMORANDUM #1

To:

Utah State Legislature

From:

Utah Liquor Control Commission

Date:

January 9. 1985

Re:

B. No.
f Alcoholic Beverage Control Act,
1985# General Session.

This memorandum has been prepared to highlight and explain the
attached proposed legislation revising Utah's present Liquor Control Act, Title 32 of the Utah Code, and Utah's Non-profit Private Club Act, Sections 16-6-12.1 through 17. A second memorandum covering the legislation chapter by chapter is separately
attached.

Legislative History of Utah's Liquor Lavs

Most of the existing law today governing the control and regulation of the sales, storage and consumption of liquor and other
alcoholic products in the state was enacted In 19351 following
the repeal of prohibition. This basic law has been the subject
of numerous minor amendments over the years dealing mainly with
the internal functioning of the commission. The majority of
these have concerned raising the taxes on beer and liquor, adJusting fees and operating budgets, allocating the revenues from
liquor sales, creating a director of liquor control, either increasing or decreasing the size of the commission and modifying
Its duties, creating a citizens' council and a liquor law enforcement division of public safety. Some major amending efforts
have occurred Including the provision for non-profit private
locker clubs In 1955# eliminating the use of private permits by

(g) Adopting, as far as applicable, the much more comprehensive forfeiture procedures of Utah's present Controlled Substance Act for forfeiting to the state alcoholic products or property used in violation of this
•ct;

(h) Clearly identifying those prosecuting agencies
having the responsibility for initiating prosecutions
under this act and delineating how such prosecutions
are initiated;

(10)

Providing a dram shop act which, unlike present law, clear-

ly covers all alcoholic beverages (including 3-2 percent by
weight beer).

(11)

Establishing a bureau within the department of public safe-

ty responsible for the enforcement of this act;

(12) Adopting a standard form of weights and measures utilized
by the federal government in describing alcoholic products, to
wit: percent of alcohol by volume rather than by weight. Thus,
*3-2 beerM is now referred to as beer having k.O percent of alcohol by volume.

The commission has endeavored throughout this legislation to preserve, wherever possible, the substantive provisions of Utah's
present liquor laws and, as stated earlier, has retained the
overall philosophy and policies of those laws.

Indeed, it is the

commission's view that it is an entity of government having the
duty to enforce the laws presented to it by the Legislature, and
should avoid becoming involved In disputes over what the substance of the law should or should not be.

Such efforts are bet-

ter left to the various factions of the community interested in
and affected by liquor control.

However, during the course of

preparing this legislation, the commission encountered some areas
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cf the present law where some substantive change would clearly
improve the administration and effectiveness of the overall law.
Father than defer action in hopes that the amending process might
sake the needed improvements at a later time, the commission
chose to incorporate them into this legislation, but did ao most
cautiously and only where it felt the effectiveness of the law
would be enhanced. Those few substantive changes proposed by
this legislation which are of significance are outlined below.

Substantive Changes in the New Legislation

1.

The concept that liquor sales in restaurants and private
clubs are from "state liquor stores" located in an area
within such facilities which is leased by the state, but
operated by a vendor associated with the restaurant or club,
has been eliminated in favor of a licensing system with increased and more direct regulation of the licensee. The new
system results in a tightening of existing law and more
closely resembles the actual administrative practice of the
present commission. The "state store in restaurants and
clubs" concept originated in the 1969 amendments to authorize the sale of liquor in such facilities, yet still
give the state a degree of control over the liquor outlet so
that the state could, at will, and with or without cause,
close "its" outlet and remove "its" liquor.

As a practical matter, this concept adds a non-essential
administrative burden on the department, causes duplicated
paperwork in the authorization and regulation of such outlets, and requires the use of artificial lease agreements
between the state and auch facilities.

All clubs where liquor is consumed are required under prestnt law to have licenses from the commission to allow the

storage and consumption of liquor on their premises. Restaurants must obtain local government approval before they
can apply to the commission to have a "state store" on their
premises which virtually always includes obtaining a local
atorage and consumption license. (See U.C.A., Sections 108-*J2 and 10-13*6). Thus, restaurants and clubs having socalled "state stores" on their premises from which liquor
sales nay be made are licensed anyway and the vendor of that
atore is usually the same person or entity accountable under
the license. The commission, in fact, now issues state
store leases and liquor consumption licenses to clubs in
tandem, and almost always suspends or revokes the consumption and storage license in tandem with the state store
lease where a violation of the act has occurred. However,
recently the commission sought to summarily remove "its"
state store from a private club pursuant to the concept that
it was really closing its own store and removing its own
liquor. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that despite the language of the act, the club nevertheless had a property
interest in having the state store located on its premises,
and held that the club was entitled to a modicum of procedural due process before the state could close and remove
the state store. See Celebrity Club, Inc., vs. ULCC. Utah,
657 P.2d 1292 (1982). 1

Thus, the State's only effort to assert the legal distinction between the license Issued to a club (which admittedly
carries with it a limited property interest once Issued) and
the leasing of apace within a club for a state store (to
avoid the assertion of a property interest by the club in
the outlet) has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.

1

The club has also filed a civil rights suit in federal court
against the commission for its summary action which is presently
pending in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

11

The "atate atore" concept also requires the commission to
Bake nominal monthly lease payments to restaurants and clubs
throughout the atate to pay for the apace within the premises where the atate atore is located. While the cost is
nominal, it adds to the administrative paperwork of the
agency. Also the lease arrangement creates questions of
liability when thefts, damage, etc., occur, and could create
similar liability questions under the Dram Shop provisions.
(Confusion is created over who really owns and has control
over the liquor.)

The new legislation has dropped the "state store" concept in
favor of regulating the sales outlets in restaurants and
clubs under a single license which authorizes the storage,
consumption * and sales of liquor on the premises. The
operational restrictions on the restaurants and clubs has
been increased to give the commission greater regulatory
control over such licensees. In the event a violation is
found after due process has been accorded to the licensee,
the license is suspended or revoked which necessarily leads
to the removal of the liquor from the premises among other
sanctions. No leases are required under this system, and
the state has really not lost any real degree of actual control over the outlet.

Finally, this system does not convert Utah from a control
atate to a so-called license state. In fact, all control
states utilize this license system. A true license state is

• Consumption of liquor in restaurants would still be permissible without a license from the atate if authorized by local
luihority. However, atorage and sales would have to be authorized by a state license as a aubstitute for the state's control under the Matate store" concept. Arguably, with the added
restrictions on operation under the new legislation, the extent
>f atate control would actually increase over that of present
Law.

for summary judgment at pp. 13-14.
(B)

If yes, please describe method.

ANSWER:

See Answer to Interrogatory 62(A).

INTERROGATORY NO. 63:

(A)

Does defendant publish a

directory of its.members?
ANSWER:
(B)

No.

If so, please describe.

ANSWER:

Not applicable.

(AA) ,Does defendant maintain a directory of JLts members?
ANSWER;
(BB)

Yes.

If so, please describe.

ANSWER;
such a directory.

The secretary of .-the defendant lodge maintains
The director contains the-.name of each member

address, and phone number.
INTERROGATORY NO. 64:

(A)

How many members belonged to

the defendant on the first day of the calendar year (or the first
day of the defendant's fiscal yea^) i n :
(a) 1989
ANSWER:
)b)

1,056.

19S8

ANSWER:

1,012.

(c) 1987
ANSWER:

996.

(d) 1986
ANSWER:

972.

(e) 1985

E4
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ANSWER:

829.

(f) 1984
ANSWER:

762.

(g) 1983
ANSWER:

710.

(h) 1982
ANSWER:
(i)

703.

1981 and,

ANSWER:

701.

(j) 1980.
ANSWER:
(B)

666.

In answering the foregoing did defendant use

calendar or fiscal year?
ANSWER:

Defendant used a fiscal year.

INTERROGATORY NO, 65;

What benefit(s), if any, does a

person secure when he becomes a member of the defendant
organization?

Please describe.

ANSWER:

A person secures no benefit from becoming a

member of the defendant lodge, other than the privilege of
association with fellow members.
INTERROGATORY NO. 66:

Please set forth and describe all

and any documents used in answering these interrogatories.
Identify them with sufficient specificity that plaintiff can make
a request for production of documents and defendant will
understand what is being requested.
ANSWER:

Documents used by defendant in answering these

interrogatories have either been referred to in the particular
E4
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INTERROGATORY NO. 43:

(A)

Please set forth the total

number of members belonging to defendant's club as of January l,
1989.
ANSWER:

1,056, as of the end of the fiscal year March

31, 1989.
(B)

Please set forth the total number of members

belonging to the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks in Utah
as of January 1, 1989.
ANSWER:
(C)

9,875, as of March 31, 1989.

Please set forth the total number of members

belonging to the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks in the
United States as of January 1, 1989.
ANSWER:
(AA)

1,475,028, as of March 31, 1989.

Please set forth the total number of members

belonging to defendant's club as of January 1, 1988.
ANSWER:
(BB)

996, as of March 31, 1988.

Please set forth the total number of members

belonging to the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks in Utah
as of January 1, 1988.
ANSWER:
(CC)

10,361, as of March 31, 1988.

Please set forth the total number of members

belonging to the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks in the
United States as of January 1, 1988.
ANSWER:

1,500,665, as of March 31, 1988.

INTERROGATORY NO. 44:
E4

(A)
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Is there any limit on the

t o t a l number of members t h a t may belong t o t h e defendant
organization?
ANSWER:

No.

(B) If yes, what?
ANSWER:
(C)

Not applicable.

If yes, at what number would defendant reject a

fully qualified member?
ANSWER:
(D)

Who or what entity set that limit?

ANSWER:
(E)

Not applicable.

Not applicable.

What is the reason for that limit?

ANSWER:

Not applicable.

INTERROGATORY NO. 45:

(A)

Has the defendant ever taken

affirmative steps in acquiring new members, e.g. membership
drive, advertising for new members, encouraging members to find
new prospective members, offering special incentives to join?
ANSWER:

Although every member is encouraged to invite

friends to join, no incentives are offered to join, the defendant
lodge does no advertising for new members, the defendant lodge
engages in no membership drivers.
(B)

If yes, describe in detail giving dates, nature of

action, etc.
ANSWER:

Encouragement given to lodge members to invite

friends to join the defendant lodge is given by speakers at
various Elk meetings.
E4
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(C) What is the approximate size in square feet of
defendant's lodge?
ANSWER:

See defendant's Answer to Interrogatory No. 2(b)

of plaintiff's first set of interrogatories.
INTERROGATORY NO. 59.

(A) How many people does

defendant employ in maintaining the lodge?
ANSWER:

Defendant employs three persons in maintaining

the lodge.
(B) How many people does defendant employ in operating
the lodge?
ANSWER:

Defendant employs 22 persons in operating the

lodge.
INTERROGATORY NO. 60:

(A) How many people does

defendant employ generally?
ANSWER:

Defendant does not understand the difference

between "employ generally" and "employ on the average", however,
defendant states that its activities are seasonal, with activities
during the fall and winter months being more numerous than those
during the months of spring and summer.

Usually, defendant

employs from 20 to 25 persons during the spring and summer months,
and 25 to 30 persons during the fall and winter months.
(AA) How many people does defendant employ on
the average?
ANSWER:

See Answer to Interrogatory 60(A).

(B) How many people does defendant employ generally and
E4
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pay wages to?
ANSWER:
(C)

See Answer to Interrogatory 60(A).

How many people does defendant employ on the average

and pay wages to?
ANSWER:

See Answer to Interrogatory 60(A).

INTERROGATORY NO. 61:

(A)

Does the defendant maintain

any list of its members which sets out the member's business,
trade or profession?
ANSWER:
(B)

Yes.

If so,

ANSWER:

please describe.

The list maintained by defendant contains a

members' trade or profession so defendant can refer to the list
when a particular activity requires special expertise, i.e.,
volunteer maintenance work needed on the lodge building,
construction of the rodeo grounds, etc.
(C)

Please list, describe and set forth any information

pertaining to any members' professions, trades, occupations,
businesses or any other commercial endeavor of defendant's members
maintained by the defendant.
ANSWER:

Defendant does not possess any information

pertaining to any members' professions, trades, occupations,
businesses or any other commercial endeavor.
INTERROGATORY NO. 62:

(A)

Is the general background of

each prospective member checked as part of the application
process?
ANSWER:
E4

See defendant's brief in support of its motion
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questions on the written application form.

List year separately

in your answer.
ANSWER:
statistics.

Defendant does not keep records of any such

Persons who may have personal knowledge of such

information include Jim Rayburn, Chairman of the defendant lodge
investigative committee; also see Answer to Interrogatory 3(b).
(B) How many non-qualified applicants were denied
membership each year during 1985 - 1988 inclusive?
separately.

List each year

"Nonqualified applicants'1 means that they did not

meet the written criteria nor appropriately answer the questions
on the written application form.
ANSWER:

See Answer to Interrogatory 17(A).

INTERROGATORY NO. 18:

(A)

Is each prospective memberfs

application checked for verity as part of the application process?
ANSWER:
(B)

Yes.

If yes, please describe the method used.

ANSWER:

See Nial McClellan affidavit at paragraph 3, pp.

2-3.
INTERROGATORY NO. 19.

(A)

Does defendant provide

regular meal service?
ANSWER:

See defendant's response to number 10(b) of

plaintiff's second set of requests for admissions.
(B) Does defendant provide any meal service?
ANSWER: Yes.
(C) Are any food products provided to members by
E4
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defendant?
ANSWER:

Yes.

INTERROGATORY NO. 20:

With regard to the preceding

interrogatory, please state:
(a)

All facts upon which defendant bases the

response(s);
ANSWER:

See Nial McClellan's affidavit generally, also

defendant provides meal service at conventions, district deputy
meetings and state association meetings.
(b)

The names and addresses of all persons who have

personal knowledge of such facts;
ANSWER:
(c)

See Answer to Interrogatory No. 3(b).

The names and addresses of all persons whom

defendant intends to call as witness at trial in the instant case
to, testify concerning such facts.
See Answer to Interrogatory No. 3(c).

ANSWER:
(d)

Currently, how many meals are served each week by

the defendant?
ANSWER:

Four meals per week, provided to members and

their guests only.
(e)
Monday?

Does the defendant regularly serve meals each

Please describe.
ANSWER:
(f)

Tuesday?
E4

No.

Does the defendant regularly serve meals each

Please describe.
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ANSWER: No.
(g)
Wednesday?

Does the defendant regularly serve meals each

Please describe.

ANSWER:

Defendant provides a Wednesday night steak fry

for members and their guests only.
(h)
Thursday?

Does the defendant regularly serve meals each

Please describe.
ANSWER: No.
(i)

Friday?

Does the defendant regularly serve meals each

Please describe.
ANSWER:

Defendant provides a Friday night dinner for

members and their guests only.
(j)
Saturday?

Does the defendant regularly serve meals each

Please describe.
ANSWER:

Defendant provides a Saturday night dinner for

members and their guests only*
(k)
Sunday?

Does the defendant regularly serve meals each

Please describe.
ANSWER:

Defendant provides a Sunday brunch for members

and their guests only.
(1)

For each week during the one year preceding June 1,

1989, please state the average number of individual meals served
by the defendant.
ANSWER:

No such records are kept by defendant,

(m) During the first five months of 1989 did the
E4
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2.

21 years of age or older;

3.

Have a belief in God;

4.

Never committed a crime;

5.

Be a non-communist;

6.

Be sponsored for membership by at least

two members of the defendant organization;
7.

Uphold the Constitution and laws of the

United States of America;
8.

Be willing to pledge allegiance to the

United States and to salute the United States flag;
9.
10.

Be of good character; and
Must promote fellowship amongst the

members of the defendant organization,
(b)

$60.00.

(c)

$75.00.

INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

(a)

For each defendant

organization, please set forth and describe the facilities
available for use by members at each lodge —

such as reception

hall, dining area, dance floor, meeting rooms, kitchen, office
space, lounge, bar, etc.
(b)

With regard to the use of such facilities by a

member of the defendant organization, please set forth the
procedure for a member to arrange to use the facility.

(That is,

if a member wants to have his daughter's wedding reception at the
Elks Lodge how does he go about arranging that, what are the
E3
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costs, if anything, etc.)
(c)

What restrictions if any, are placed by the

defendants upon the use of said facilities by a member.

(Such as,

an admission fee cannot be charged; if liquor is served if must be
purchased from the lodge*s private liquor club; no one under
twenty-one years can attend, etc.)
ANSWER:

(a)

Dining area, dance floor, meeting rooms,

kitchen, office space, lounge and bar.
(b)

A person desiring to use any of defendant

organization's facilities must first be sponsored by a member of
the organization.

He then makes a reservation with the person on

duty at the office of defendant organization.

Defendant

organization determines the amount of rent to be paid by
determining a per-person charge.

This amount is calculated in an

effort to cover the costs of providing the facility and services
only.

Also, food is provided by defendant organization if

requested.
(c)
bar.

No one under 21 years of age can enter the

Any non-member wishing to use the facilities must have a

valid Elks identification card.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

Question to the ST. GEORGE-DIXIE

LODGE only:
(a)

Why was the named plaintiff rejected for member-

(b)

Who contacted the members of the Elks listed as

ship?

E3
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(a)

the number of patrons of the facilities of the

(b)

the number of these patrons who were members of

defendant;

the defendant organization;
(c)

the number of these patrons who were guests of

members of the defendant organization.
ANSWER:

(a)

Unknown, no records of this type are kept.

(b)

See Answer to Interrogatory 32(a).

(c)

See Answer to Interrogatory 32(a).

INTERROGATORY NO. 35:

For each of the defendant

organizations, for each month of the calendar year 1986, please
estimate or state:
(a)

the number of patrons of the facilities of the

(b)

the number of these patrons who were members of

defendant;

the defendant organization;
(c)

the number of these patrons who were guests of

members of the defendant organization.
ANSWER:

(a)

Unknown, no records of this type are kept.

(b)

See Answer to Interrogatory 32(a).

(c)

See Answer to Interrogatory 32(a).

INTERROGATORY NO. 36:

For each of the defendant

organizations, for each month of the calendar year 1987, please
state the names of all organizations that used the defendant's
facilities for meetings, luncheons, etc.
E3
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That is, did the Rotary

Club have a luncheon at your lodge?
ANSWER:

The Catholic Church, the Masonic Lodge, the

local police department, the local bridge association, the local
golf association, K-Mart and Rocky Mountain Produce.
INTERROGATORY NO. 37: For each of the defendant
organizations, for each month of the calendar year 1986, please
state the names of all organizations that used the defendant's
facilities for meetings, luncheons, etc. That is, did the Rotary
Club have a luncheon at your lodge?
ANSWER:

Defendant does not presently recall specific

names of any organizations which used defendant's facilities
during the year 1986, but will provide a copy of defendant's
reservation list for that year to plaintiff as soon as possible,
if such a list still exists.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3 8: Has a women ever applied for
membership in your lodge?

If so, when?

If so what was the result

of the application?
ANSWER:

Other than Sandra Beynon, defendant does not

know of any other woman who has applied for membership in its
lodge.
INTERROGATORY NO. 39:

(A) Please set forth all city,

county or state licenses issued to your lodge —

such as health

department, charitable solicitation, business, etc.
(B) List name of license, date of issue and
government involved.
E3
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INTERROGATORY NO. 41;
(a)

How many persons ceased to be members of the

defendant club during the year 1988?
ANSWER:
(b)

107.

How many persons ceased to be members of the

defendant club during the year 1987?
ANSWER:
(c)

113.

How many persons ceased to be members of the

defendant club during the year 1986?
ANSWER:
(d)

104.

How many persons ceased to be members of the

defendant club during the year 1985?
ANSWER:
(e)

74.

How many persons ceased to be members of the

defendant club during the year 1984?
ANSWER:
(f)

58.

How many persons ceased to be members of the

defendant club during the year 1983?
ANSWER:
(g)

49.

How many persons ceased to be members of the

defendant club during the year 1982?
ANSWER:
(h)

53.

How many persons ceased to be members of the

defendant club during the year 1981?
ANSWER:
E4
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(i) How many members ceased or stopped going to the
defendant club during the .year 1988?
ANSWER:

Defendant does not have any such records.

(j) How many member ceased or stopped going to the
defendant club during the year 1987?
(k) How many members ceased or stopped going to the
defendant club during the year 1986?
ANSWER:

Defendant does not have any such records.

(1) How many persons ceased or stopped going to the
defendant club during the year 1985?
ANSWER:

Defendant does not have any such records.

(m) How many persons ceased or stopped going to the
defendant club during the year 1984?
ANSWER:

Defendant does not have any such records.

(n) How many persons ceased or stopped going to the
defendant club during the year 1983?
ANSWER:

Defendant does not have any such records.

(o) How many persons ceased or stopped going to the
defendant club during the year 1982?
ANSWER:

Defendant does not have any such records.

(p) How many persons ceased or stopped going to the
defendant club during the year 1981?
ANSWER:

E4

Defendant does not have any such records.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 42:
(a)

How many persons became members of the defendant

club during the year 1988?
ANSWER:
(b)

154.

How many persons became members of the defendant

club during the year 1987?
ANSWER:
(c)

127.

How many persons became members of the defendant

club during the year 1986?
ANSWER:
(d)

127.

How many persons became members of the defendant

club during the year 1985?
ANSWER:
(aa)

149.

How many persons became members of the defendant

club during the year 1984?
ANSWER:
(bb)

126.

How many persons became members of the defendant

club during the year 1983?
ANSWER:
(cc)

116.

How many persons became members of the defendant

club during the year 1982?
ANSWER:
(dd)

105.

How many persons became members of the defendant

club during the year 1981?
ANSWER: 75.
E4
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total number of members that may belong to the defendant
organization?
ANSWER:

No.

(B) If yes, what?
ANSWER:
(C)

Not applicable.

If yes, at what number would defendant reject a

fully qualified member?
ANSWER:
(D)

Who or what entity set that limit?

ANSWER:
(E)

Not applicable.

Not applicable. .

What is the reason for that limit?

ANSWER:

Not applicable.

INTERROGATORY NO. 45:

(A)

Has the defendant ever taken

affirmative steps in acquiring new members, e.g. membership
drive, advertising for new members, encouraging members to find
new prospective members, offering special incentives to join?
ANSWER:

Although every member is encouraged to invite

friends to join, no incentives are offered to join, the defendant
lodge does no advertising for new members, the defendant lodge
engages in no membership drivers.
(B)

If yes, describe in detail giving dates, nature of

action, etc.
ANSWER:

Encouragement given to lodge members to invite

friends to join the defendant lodge is given by speakers at
various Elk meetings.
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